The question as to whether the industrialization programme in Australia was a success depends to a large extent upon ethnocentric assumptions concerned about how effectively Australia emulates Western models. This assumption, however, is problematic simply because Australia’s position in the global economy is distinct. As Hocking and Maguire have suggested, the industrialization programme may have proven less successful in terms of how extensive and ubiquitous the transformation programme was, but this does not detract from the fact that Australia is widely considered to be a highly developed economy. The problem, they argue, is that industrialization is built upon the fact that the terminology itself is built upon a “nomenclature” that “are based on a particular Western notion of modernization”. [1] In the case of Australia, the industrialization programme was not on the scale of other, similar Western and “developed” economies, but this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the industrialisation programme was not as successful: “the dichotomy of advanced industrialized / newly industrialized / industrializing”, according to Hocking and Maguire, does not fit in the case of Australia and New Zealand because they are “very wealthy nations” which have “relatively low levels of industrialization.” [2] As such, in order to ascertain whether the industrialization programme can be considered a success, it is necessary to avoid any simple, quantitative analysis of how extensive and widespread industrialisation was, in favour of more contextual and regional factors that led to the development and industrialization of select parts of the Australian economy.

In the period prior to 1950, Australia had already undergone significant transformations based largely on the needs and requirements of Britain: this initial period of industrialization was overambitious in its scope, but was nonetheless relatively successful in constructing an export-based industrial economy. As Kenwood and Lougheed suggested, the initial industrialization programme was based upon loans and assistance provided by Great Britain to deal with increased demand for labour in the Australian economy during this initial period and, while the Empire Settlement Act of 1922 was intended to provide migration opportunities for 500,000 migrants over a period of ten years, in reality “there was a net inflow of 300,000 migrants in the 1920s, of whom two-thirds were assisted.” [3] This industrialisation programme in Australia was given greater precedence during the Second World War. However, according to Jaffe, this programme was not, as some critics argue, transformative, but merely representative of an underlying trend that was already present: “Wartime industrial development in Australia merely accelerated a process that was already under way.” [4] Before the war, Australia had already undergone significant industrial transformation, and an analysis of the period 1950-1973 should consider that, in many respects, the underlying and foundational work had already taken place and proceeded in a relatively successful fashion. The economic shifts that resulted from the Second World War, however, led to radical shifts in the way in which the Australian economy came to be composed.

The position of Australia as a colony of Great Britain did not lead to the significant oppression or to structural shifts in the period following the World War: in other words, the Australian economy was left to develop with relative freedom from the demands of Great Britain. This, in comparison to other colonies where colonial rule was more oppressive, led to significant industrial development based on internal, as well as export-based demand: Emmerij argued that the focus on economic development in Australia during this “golden age” period was relatively successful, precisely because these developing countries had “sufficient political autonomy from their colonial rulers to be able to set their own economic policies so as to benefit domestic industrialization.” [5] Thus, according to Emmerij, the consolidation tactics employed during the period between 1950 and 1973 was a success precisely because the infrastructure of the industrialisation programme was geared toward domestic production goals. Unlike India and other colonies of Britain, British policy was characterised by a relatively laissez-faire approach to the internal economic, political and social factors in the economy. And, while the industrialisation programme and the massive influx of labour from Great Britain created inevitable social and cultural schisms in the industrial economy, the overall developmental objectives of the programme were, by and large, met.

The period between 1950 and 1973 was also relatively successful in statistical terms. The United Nations Report on Globalization and Development suggests that the industrialisation programme in Australia, and the specific characteristics of it, where industrialisation catered to domestic demand as well as exports, led to a GDP growth of 4.03 percent. [6] While this was less than the growth enjoyed by other regions of the global economy, it does nonetheless mark a significant increase as compared to periods prior to it. Of course, a simple statistical analysis does not convey the cultural, social and economic complexities that characterised the period, and also belies the fact that the majority of the long-term infrastructural and developmental programmes inherent to the industrialization programme in Australia were put in place prior to the period in question. As such, determining the success of Australia’s programme of industrialisation during this period is difficult to isolate from the historical and contextual factors that preceded it. Nonetheless, it is important to note that, while the Australian industrial programme may not have been executed perfectly, it can still nonetheless be regarded as a success in economic terms simply because it led to a sustained economic growth and a development of the domestic economy in general.

The development of the industrialisation programme in the period between 1950 and 1973 was characterised by a general post-war economic boom that affected virtually all aspects of the global economy. Abramovitz argues that the principle reason for this general boom in the global economy was due to it being a period of “catch-up”, in which the technological developments over the previous period, most of which were in the industrial sector, were exported into developing regions of the economy. [7] It is therefore important to consider that the Australian success was not undertaken in independence to broader economic trends throughout the global economy. As Maddock and McLean point out, the industrialisation programme can be seen as neither a particular example of a success of a failure simply because the Australian economy and industrialisation programme merely reflected global, rather than national trends – and while the development of a domestic agenda acted as a buffer against the recession during the early 1970s, the industrialisation agenda was neither particularly successful, nor was it catastrophic: “The long economic boom in the world economy that followed the end of the second world war was fully shared by Australia” and, while initially the focus was on providing “international demand for agricultural products”, this sustained demand developed into a coherent and sustainable industrialisation agenda. In the post-war period, Australia also experienced a “period of rapid industrial development” which, in economic terms, can be seen as a great success: much of this success was due to the relaxed approach Australian society had towards migration during this boom period: “immigrants formed an important component of the manufacturing workforce, and of the return of mineral industries to prominence as export earners.” [8] Thus, the economic boom in demand for agricultural products facilitated a shift from agriculture to industry and, while the increase of migration led to significant divisions between different ethnicities, the economic expansion of Australia can generally be seen to be as equally successful as Western economies.

The transformation of the relatively rural economy of the post-war period into a rapidly industrialised economy is cited by many economists as the central feature that led to the economic boom in Australian society during this period. As Maddock points out, this transformation was undertaken as a result of a change in the way in which new technologies were used: “the initial [post-war] increase was mainly [due to] investment in the rural sector, although manufacturing was also important.” By the 1950s, however, the focus on manufacturing led to the rise of both commercial and manufacturing as a primary base for economic expansion: “The rapid expansion of manufacturing,” according to Maddock, “was associated with substantial capital flows and associated with the global growth of multinationals as well as the incentives provided by the Australian system of tariffs.” [9] Indeed, the economic underpinnings of the Australian boom came about because Australian investment opportunities were exploited by these multinational companies who sought to exploit the relatively liberal and anti-isolationist tariff and taxation measures in the Australian economy. Thus, while the industrialisation programme was already underway prior to the period discussed, the transitional process of industrialisation can be characterised as successful during this period also, namely because the economic management of Australia facilitated this shift away from rural towards urban, industrial development fuelled by capital flows, tariff rates and consequent multinational interest.

New capital investment and stock fuelled by this boom in investment is due to a wide variety of factors, which relate both to domestic and foreign economic trends. And, while Gregory and James and Haig have argued as to whether the technologies and investment in new capital stock significantly increased productivity in the Australian economy, it can nevertheless be ascertained that the renewal of technologies, as well as the influx of labour, the increase of demand based on an economy geared towards providing favourable investment conditions for global multinationals had a significant impact on the development of the Australian economy. [10] 

Overall, it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which the Australian economy was particularly successful because it can be seen as dependent on a variety of factors external to it. Firstly, domestic policy prior to the post-war boom period assisted in generating an appropriate infrastructure that, contrary to other colonies such as India, did not suffer from excessive interference on a political or economic level. As such, Australia was well placed prior to the period because the economy catered towards domestic, as well as export-led technological development. Against the background of this initial boom in industrialisation, the period of 1950 to 1973 can be seen as a period of consolidation and, as such, is subject to a wide variety of economic interpretations regarding its success. Secondly, the success of the industrialisation programme during the period in question is determined by both external and domestic patterns: the post-war period was characterised by a global expansion of trade across vast regions of the economy – Australia was well placed to take advantage of these shifts, and a combination of tariffs, capital flows and favourable economic conditions attracted the investment from a growing group of multinational companies. As such, whether the indistrialisation programme in Australia should be considered a consolidation of previous industrialisation programmes, or a distinctive period, it was nonetheless a success in that it created economic growth that was both sustainable and large.