Executive
Summary

The membership of Turkey is one of the most controversial external relations issues of the European Union (EU).  Turkey is an important trading partner for the EU and provides many economic advantages to the union.  Additionally, it has a strategic location, allowing it to play an important regional and foreign policy role.  However, there are issues related to Turkey’s accession, such as large migration flows to more economically developed EU-15 countries as well as a substandard human rights situation within the country (Gerhards and Hans, 2011: 751).  Overall, this policy note recommends that Turkey should be allowed to join the EU on the basis of EU economic development and foreign policy advantages.  Despite the issues related to accession of Turkey into the EU, this paper argues that EU-membership will work as a catalyst for Turkish institutional reforms.

Introduction

Turkish entry into the European Union is a
highly contentious issue.  Turkey has
progressed on the way to EU membership in spite of persistent and increasing
divergence of membership preferences (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 413-415).  Turkey, with its
large, dynamic economy, is an important trading partner for the EU, it also has
a strategic location, including on energy security, and plays an important
regional role. Equally, the EU remains an important anchor for Turkey’s
economic and political reform (Progress Report, 2013: 1). 

This paper will first
provide an analysis and outline of the different factors relating to the
accession of Turkey into the EU.  It will
explore economic factors, cultural factors and political factors.  Finally, this paper will recommend that
Turkey should be allowed to join the EU due to its positive affect on EU
economic development, as well as the fact that Turkey has made good progress in
meeting a lot of the Accession criteria set out in the Copenhagen agreement.  This paper will also make recommendations on what
Turkey must do in order to fully meet EU standards for accession.

Context

Turkey first became affiliated with the EU in
1963 after signing an associate membership agreement with the then European Community.  The decisions to give
Turkey a membership perspective and to open accession negotiations have been
highly controversial among member state governments and have tended to produce
long and conflictive negotiations as well as uneasy compromises
(Schimmelfennig, 2009: 414).  A major breakthrough came at the
Helsinki meeting of the European Council in 1999, when Turkey attained status
as a candidate for membership. It now has a so-called Accession Partnership
with the EU, which means that the EU is working
together with Turkey to enable it to adopt the acquis communautaire, which
is the legal framework of the EU (Togan, 2004: 1013).

The Copenhagen Criteria cover a
state’s ability to take on the acquis communautaire, the economic
criteria for a functional market economy, and above all, ‘stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect
for and protection of minorities’ (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 420).  Overall, Turkey has made
significant efforts to fulfil requested accession criteria through
socio-economic and cultural convergence with EU Member States.

Analysis

Economic Factors

Many studies have shown that economic factors
play a significant role in shaping attitudes towards different aspects of
European integration. Turkey’s
progress on meeting the requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria is confirmed by
socioeconomic indicators that describe the level of modernization of the
country (Alber, 2007).  Turkey is the 17^th
largest economy globally, and the most current EU progress report states that
Turkey has sufficient macroeconomic stability and the medium-term capability
for integration into the single European market (Gerhards and Hans, 2011: 744).  Turkey is a large and fast expanding market,
it is the largest market in the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus. According to
the World Bank, Turkish GDP is as large as 80 per cent of Russian GDP (Togan,
2004: 1043). 

Turkey, located at the crossroads between
Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East, has the potential to act as a major link
between these markets.  With
harmonization of commercial legislation, EU companies will be able to use
Turkey as a joint investment and export base for the Middle East and Eurasia.  Moreover, Istanbul is emerging as
transnational corporations’ headquarters for operations in the Caucasus and
Central Asia. The EU will derive potential gains from increased trade in the
region (Togan, 2004: 1043-1044).

Overall, the Progress Report on Turkey’s EU
Accession (2013: 4) states that Turkey is a functioning market economy, and
should therefore be able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces
within the Union in the medium term. 
Additionally, with Turkish accession current members will derive welfare
gains from standard comparative advantage sources and also from growth effects
of integration.

This report argues that accession of Turkey
to the EU will bring economic benefits for Turkey as well as to the EU
itself.  The largest economic gains can
be obtained through reforms of national institutions in Turkey that improve the
functioning of the public sector and provide transparency to investors and
traders (Lejour and Mooij, 2005: 117).  Integration will remove the
distortions in the price system, boosting the allocative efficiency in the
economy, which in turn will make the country a better place to invest.  Furthermore, with accession Turkey will be
eligible for EU structural funds. The increase in infrastructural investments will
contribute to economic growth in Turkey. In addition, Turkey will reap benefits
from monetary integration, and finally, Turkey will benefit from migration of
Turkish labour to the EU (Togan, 2004: 1042).

The key theoretical constructs investigated
to explain opposition to Turkey’s EU membership are related to rational
economic self-interest and group-level interests and concerns (McClaren, 2007:
251).  Turkey is relatively poor and
agricultural, it can therefore be argued that Turkish membership is likely to
increase the divergence of living standards in the EU, create a high potential
for labour migration and instigate demand for high net payments from the structural
and agricultural funds.  Welfare gains
that will be derived by Turkey from integration will have a price. The price
will be the adjustment costs associated with the attainment of macroeconomic
stability, adoption of CAP, liberalization of services and network industries,
and complying with EU environmental directives (Togan, 2004: 1042).

Migration/Cultural Factors

In addition to direct fiscal implications,
EU member states are subject to another possible economic consequence of
Turkish accession, immigration. 
Hostility to Turkey’s candidacy can be explained by the threatening
context of Turkish migration (McClaren, 2007: 251).  It can be argued that migration flows could
have negative economic consequences, such as increased competition in
particular segments of the labour market. 
In particular, countries in the more economically developed EU-15 are
likely to be affected to the highest degree (Gerhards and Hans, 2011: 751),
moreover it will likely take decades before Turkey attains an income level
comparable to these countries.  This will
continue to be a strong incentive for migration from Turkey to other EU
countries, EU-15 countries fear that the immigrants will ‘depress wages, boost unemployment
and cause social friction and political upheavals’ (Togan, 2004: 1031-1032).

However, one assumption in the
analysis of Turkish migration is that all labour is homogenous.  In reality labour is highly differentiated
according to many factors, which results in the effects of migration for income
distribution and social welfare becoming less clear-cut.  The empirical research on the economic effects
of immigration indicates fairly small and on the whole positive effects.  ‘Employment opportunities are not affected
much, the wage of low skilled labour is depressed somewhat but that of skilled
labour is raised, and the net present value of public transfers is positive’ (Togan,
2004: 1043).  Therefore, this paper
argues that with appropriate measures, immigration is not necessarily a
negative consequence of Turkey’s accession into the EU.

It is not just the threat to resources
presented by Turks that affects feelings about the Turkish candidacy, threats
to culture and way of life are likely to be particularly strong in the Turkish
case (Ivarsflaten, 2005).  In addition to
the possible problem of being perceived as traditional or backward, Turkey
faces the potential difficulty of being predominantly Muslim (McClaren, 2007:
258).  The recent drawbacks in the
negotiations of the EU with Croatia, Serbia, and Turkey have been caused by
issues of national identity related to legacies of ethnic conflict that are
likely to create high political costs to the target governments. As a result,
whereas consistency has remained high, effectiveness is reduced (Schimmelfennig,
2004: 918). 

Nevertheless, sociostructural
differences between Turkey and the EU Member States have been shrinking.  The percentage of the Turkish population
working in agriculture has sunk, education levels have risen and the overall
standard of living has increased (Gerhards and Hans, 2011: 744).

The commission critiques Turkey
on its human rights situation, on its limited freedom of speech and on its lack
of gender equality.  However, according
to the Freedom House Index, Turkey has improved consistently in its level of
democratization, political freedom and civil liberties over recent years
(Gerhards and Hans, 2011: 744).  Overall,
these improvements represent measurable developments regarding Turkey’s convergence
with the EU and its fulfilment of EU accession criteria.  Additionally, Freedom in the Press has
improved, however, it still has a long way to go in order to reach the levels
of freedom held by EU-15 countries.  Key
provisions of the Turkish legal framework and their interpretation by members
of the judiciary continue to hamper freedom of expression, including freedom of
the media (Progress Report, 2013: 2).

Foreign Policy

The
commission emphasized Turkey’s
increasingly important foreign policy significance for Europe, for example its
intermediary role between Syria and Israel, its diplomatic approaches with
Armenia, and above all, its role in the military conflict between Russia and
Georgia (Schmid, 2008).  Turkey has
continued to play an important role in its wider neighbourhood, for example
expanding its activities as a non-traditional donor in the Horn of Africa,
supporting democratic transition in North Africa, and enhancing cooperation
with and between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It has played a particularly
important role on Syria, supporting the development of a more unified
opposition and providing vital humanitarian assistance to large numbers of
Syrians fleeing their country (Progress Report, 2013: 3).  This suggests Turkey is meeting criteria of
the Copenhagen Agreement such as the rule of law and the respect for and
protection of minorities. 

According to the Commission (2008b), expansion in general
and Turkish membership specifically would strengthen the EU’s foreign policy
weight in the world.  Furthermore,
Turkey’s geographic location makes it well-suited as a transit country for oil
and natural gas and it could therefore play a strategic role in securing the
EU’s energy supply (Gerhards
and Hans, 2011: 744).  Turkish membership could help to secure
stability and security in the Balkans and Caucasus. The EU could then increase
its energy security and also decrease its defence expenditures (Togan, 2004:
1043-1044).  This paper argues that this
is indication that Turkey should be allowed to join the EU.

Recommendations

In order to maintain its impact on political reform under
the conditions of political unrest, the EU will need to reassure applicant
governments of the credibility of its commitment to enlargement and move
negotiations with Turkey closer to the endgame. 
Creating uncertainty about admission even after full compliance destroys
this credibility and will reduce the effectiveness of conditionality even further
(schimmelfennig, 2008: 933).  Overall,
this policy note recommends that Turkey should be allowed to join the EU on the
basis of EU economic development and foreign policy advantages provided it
agrees to make continued efforts in the realm of human rights. 

The issues with regards to human rights in Turkey underline
the importance for the EU to enhance its engagement with Turkey.  This paper recommends that the overall legal
framework and practice on the intervention of law enforcement officers should
be brought in line with European standards to guarantee under all circumstances
the right to freedom of assembly. 
Additionally, an ECHR-compatible legal framework has yet to be
established on matters of faith and conscientious objection.  Substantial efforts are needed to effectively
guarantee the rights of women, children and LGBT individuals (Progress Report,
2013: 2).  These shortcomings need to be
addressed in order for Turkey to be a successful member of the EU.

In regards to immigration associated with the accession of
Turkey to the EU, this paper recommends that government leaders will need to
adopt measures to allay fears among EU citizens, perhaps including provision
for a waiting period on the free movement of labour provision (McClaren, 2007:
274, Gerhards and Hans, 2011: 763).

In conclusion, this report argues that
EU-membership will work as a catalyst for Turkish institutional reforms.  Turkey has made progress towards meeting a
good amount of the accession criteria, and by becoming a member of the EU,
Turkey has to conform to all EU legislation and enforcement by the European
Court of Justice.  Furthemore, via the
method of open coordination, Turkey will regularly be assessed by the European
Commission and other member countries on its economic policies.  EU membership can thus trigger institutional
reform in Turkey and reduce widespread corruption (Lejour and de Mooij, 2005:
101). 

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