RESPONSE TO BELLOW POST
Grace Salerno(Aug 8, 2018 9:47 PM) – Read by: 5 Reply
Hello class,
The “cyber” concept is so critical to address from an intelligence standpoint because of the capability it possesses. As outlined in the Lesson this week, a Cyber Network Attack would refer to an attempt to use a computer to alter, interrupt, or eliminate information obtained from a network, while a Cyber Network Exploitation is merely using a computer as a means of intelligence collection from an adversary. While an exploitation differs from an attack in severity, both possess the ability to weaken or overtake system infrastructure and steal information that could subsequently be used against the United States if discovered. Cyber Network Defense would refer to the actions taken by U.S. agencies to detect and protect against such attacks, counterintelligence to a degree.
From a national security standpoint, cyberspace is a prime target for infiltration and exploitation due to its inherent accessibility and affordability. Anyone with access to a computer and an internet connection possesses the opportunity to engage in cyberwarfare. The threats to the national security and national intelligence of the United States can range from “disruption, to simple theft, to taking down critical infrastructure, to disrupting government functions” (INSA 2011, 7). Based on this, the negative impact that a cyber attack could have is potentially untapped. “The intelligence community stressed the same point in its annual threat report to Congress last year, arguing that offensive tactics — known as vulnerability discovery and exploitation —are evolving more rapidly than the federal government and industry can adapt their defensive best practices” (Rid 2012). As it stands, the ability to be successful at offensive intelligence counter methods sometimes is rooted in learning from failures.
As discussed in Zegart, intelligence collection can be beneficial in the detection of counterterrorism efforts, a failure of which is highlighted by the successful attacks on September 11, 2001. In this instance, the United States possessed information which could have ultimately led to the detection of terrorists involved prior to the incident (Zegart 2005). Ultimately, the events on September 11, 2001, highlighted the inability of the United States intelligence agencies to adequately evaluate and adapt to the terrorism threat. Concerning the cyber threat vector, the United States must remain diligent in assessment and forecasting as the full capabilities of cyber space are likely unknown. However, the United States has been privy to the vulnerability of information networks by cyber-attacks dating back to 1995, when the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Science Board recognized that “the linkage between information systems and traditional critical infrastructures has increased the scope and potential of the information warfare threat” (Warner 2012, 796). Individuals seem to be aware that any information shared on the web lacks a certain level of privacy, and government information disseminated and shared via computers is no exception. While government servers are sure to be encrypted and protected by security measures, the benefits and convenience of the internet must always be approached with caution. Concerning matters of national security, the United States recognizes the potential weaknesses associated with online communications and aims to uphold the prevention of engagement in cyber warfare, while simultaneously ready to respond to any adversaries.
Best,
Grace
References
Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA). 2011. “Cyber intelligence: Setting the
landscape for an emerging discipline,” INSA. 1-18.
Rid, Thomas. 2012. “Think again: cyberwar: don’t fear the digital bogeyman. Virtual conflict is
still more hype than reality.” Foreign Policy (192): 80.
Warner, Michael. 2012. Cybersecurity: A pre-history. Intelligence and National Security 27 (5):
781-99.
Zegart, Amy B. 2005. September 11 and the adaptation failure of U.S. intelligence agencies.
International Security 29 (4): 78-111.
EXAMPLE OF SOMEONE RESPONSE
Re: Salerno Week 1
Jason Buttram(Aug 9, 2018 3:52 AM) – Read by: 4 Reply
Grace,
Great forum post. You hit one of the most concerning points I made in my forum with regards to the intelligence gap in information sharing between intelligence agencies in a post 9/11 operating environment. Although intelligence sharing has become infinitely better since then, those gaps remain persistent. With so many organizations focused on cyber security across agencies, military services, and departments, cyber intelligence collection becomes decentralize causing those mentioned organizations to operate in a noncontiguous information sharing environment (GAO 2011, 4). This could give any cyber threat or actor a notable advantage. The Department of Homeland Security acknowledges the potential gap and mitigates it with the establishment of their National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) (Jasper 2016, 58). NCCIC acts a focal point for multiple departments, agencies and private sector liaisons to share intelligence and kick that information out to their perspective handlers (Ibid). This was enacted recently under the Former President Obama Administration with the passing of the “Cybersecurity Act of 2015” forcing the timely sharing of cyber threat indicators (Ibid., 60). I hate to use this phrase too often, but in my recent experience, this methodology of sharing still needs vast improvement. Being in the military and working directly with NSA has been fraught with challenges, mostly minor power struggles, hubris, and differing intelligence languages. It’s not just one sided, but is conducted on both sides of the coin and we all work in the same building. I could list a myriad of other challenges that impede any type of sharing, but at the end of the day the IC and cybersecurity are light years ahead of where we were 17 years ago. I’d be interested in your thoughts on intelligence sharing? I welcome any disagreement. Great post. Cheers!
v/r
Jason
Reference:
Jasper, Scott E. 2016. “U.S. Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing frameworks.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 30, no. 1 (Fall): 53-65. Accessed August 9, 2018. https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/08850607.2016.1230701.
U.S. Government. Government Accountability Office (GAO). A Briefing for the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives (July 29, 2011). Accessed August 9, 2018. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11695r.pdf.
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