Colombia and Peru: The
Wolves of the Illegal Drug Trade and Attempting to Stop It

The war on drugs has created a discourse
around the world centralized on the premise of eradicating the means of
production for psychoactive substances such as marijuana, heroine, and cocaine.
While this battle transcends territorial boundaries, it is spearheaded by
Western governments and multinational organizations; specifically, the United
States of America which many of these substances are destined to be exported to
from primary producing countries. As a result, this discourse has also been
centered on the countries known to produce the bulk of these substances. The
countries which supply the majority of said substances are situated in Latin
America, specifically, Colombia and Peru. These two countries have been the converging
points in which international attention has been focussed and where the primary
effort to combat the production and trade of these substances has been placed. Through
the comparison of Colombia and Peru’s social, political and judicial environments,
their chosen methods in combating the trade of illegal drugs and the success of
said methods become evident. Historically and in the present, the countries of
Colombia and Peru have had significant numbers of influential drug trade
organizations (DTO’s) operating throughout them resulting in extreme levels of
violence and high levels of illegal substance production. While the Colombian
and Peruvian governments have utilized similar tactics to try and resolve the
issue of the national and international drug trade, both have proven
ineffective due to a lack in political influence, economic stability, and
judicial integrity.

            To gather a sense of whether Colombia
and Peru’s anti-drug trade policies have proven to be effective, these
countries historical economic states must be considered. As such, the
analyzation of Peru’s economic state will be looked at first. Peru’s relationship
with the production of illegal drugs hinges on the coca plant. Off and on from
the early 1990’s to present day, Peru has fluctuated between the worlds primary
and secondary producer of coca leaf (Lerner, 1998). Peru’s dominance in the
cultivation of the coca leaf stems from its cultural and traditional relation
to this species of plant and how this relation has been interpreted and
accepted by modern Peruvian governments and society. As such, the use of the
coca plant has been used in the production of coca tea; an entirely legal
activity in Peru. Thusly, due to the importance of the coca leaf in Peruvian
culture, the production and consumption of the coca leaf was legal until 1978.[1] It
wasn’t until the rise of cartels and their expansion from Colombia to Peru and
their impacts noticeable and having an impact on Peruvian society, that the cultivation
and production of coca leaf was controlled. With the rise of cartels and their
influence penetrating Peruvian society, the legal framework for controlling the
production of the coca leaf was conceived and legitimized through Decree Law
22095 (Lerner, 1998).

Although the Peruvian government had imposed
regulation over the production of the coca leaf, the continued production of it
and or processing into coca paste and cocaine was vastly more lucrative than
the cultivation of other plants. As a result, Peru’s high level of rural
poverty, unstable economy, and the small margin made from cultivating and
harvesting other plants provided the reason for many Peruvians to focus their
efforts towards the cultivation of coca and the production of its derivatives (Alvarez,
1992).

            Because of this pre-established tradition
within Peruvian society, the production of coca had already been normalized
within society. The poor economic conditions for a largely poor rural class and
the creation of a new market in which Peru had a comparative advantage suddenly
culminated in many rural populations engaging in the cultivation of coca or the
production of coca paste. The benefit of engaging in the production of coca for
Peru’s poor rural populations is demonstrated by Elena Alvarez as she explains,
“Studies estimate per-capita income for Andean peasants at around $50 in the
early 1970’s and somewhere between $157 and $620 in the early 1980’s.”
(Alvarez, 1992, p. 72). Thusly, these annual income estimates, specifically the
second figure, refers to the significant increase in annual earnings by Andean
peasants when they began growing the coca plant and engaging in the cocaine
industry. It is evident that such an increase in wages would be highly
appealing to the Peruvian peasantry. Furthermore, this steep increase in annual
income for the peasantry is vital in demonstrating the poor economic state that
Peru was in prior to its conceived monopoly over coca plant production. 

            Associated with the boom of coca,
another aspect played an important role in rural populations transitioning to
the production of coca; the rise of the Western diet in urban centres, the
transition away from Andean goods, and the rise of hyperinflation resulting in
economic crisis throughout Peru. Firstly, the transition to a Western diet in
urban centres further promoted the production of coca as the profitability of
supplying these urban centres with foodstuffs sharply declined (Alvarez, 1992).
Secondly, from the 1980’s to the mid 1990’s Peru experienced drastic rates of
inflation which resulted in it having to abandon its national currency, the
Inti and replace it with the Sol in 1991. This greatly impacted the economy and
resulted in many Peruvian’s being plunged into economic ruin. The rate of
hyper-inflation reached its peak in 1991 with an inflation rate of over 7000
percent[2].
Because of such tough economic times, a rising population was growing in Peru
which was out of work and suffering. Thusly, the profitability of engaging in
the production of the coca plant and its derivatives provided this group with
financial security. At the time, this was difficult to find and spurred the
creation of micro-economies (Lerner, 1998, p. 121). Consequently, due to high
levels of economic uncertainty and social suffering, the conditions were ripe
for Peruvian peasantry to engage in the cultivation of the coca plant, its
derivatives, and the illegal drug trade because of the socially formed idea
around the coca plant, its ties to Peruvian tradition, and weak economic
institutions failing to provide the people of Peru with a stable economy.
Lastly, the Peruvian governments attempt at combating the illegal drug trade by
implementing programs of crop substitution to attempt and sway the peasantry
from growing the coca plant largely failed due to the low annual income that
other plants could provide.

            The points made above all refer to
the reasons as to why Peru has become such a significant player in the
production of illegal drugs, primarily cocaine. These points are essential in
demonstrating how the cocaine industry has become such an important aspect of
the agrarian economy and why the methods utilized by the Peruvian government
have failed to adequately deal with the on-going issue of the international
drug trade. While Peru has been strafed by economic instability and weak
government thus being unable to properly combat the international drug trade,
this has also been the case for the country of Colombia. In the case of
Colombia, it has been faced with the problem of powerful paramilitary forces
and wealthy cartels, most notably, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –
FARC, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), and the Medllin and Cali
cartels. These groups engaging in the cultivation, production and international
trade of illicit substances and committing acts of violence. While the
high-level political threat that paramilitary groups in Colombia is not a
shared theme with regards to Peru, the influence of cartels has been
experienced by both countries.

Just as Peru has experienced economic
hardship, Colombia also shared in this pain following the Asian Crisis in 1998
in which traders panicked and dumped their shares in ‘emerging markets’
resulting in Colombia’s currency to slide (Livingstone, 2004). Because of this
economic crisis, the governing administration during this time under the
leadership of Andres Pastrana experienced the lowest approval rating in
Colombian history. Livingstone also mentions that the economic crisis led to a
drastic rise in conflict and in addition, greatly impacted the profits made by
the economy during this period.

The discourse around the international
drug trade has been a prominent topic around the globe as the import and export
of illegal drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and marijuana have directly impacted societies
within Latin America but also North America and Europe as well. The source for
much of the world’s production of illicit drugs stem directly from the Latin
American countries of Colombia and Peru. Largely, resulting from the immense
production of illicit psychoactive substances like Marijuana, Cocaine, and
Heroine; these countries have implemented anti-drug policies which have
produced complex and varying results. Some of the primary methods which
Colombia and Peru have utilized to combat the production and trade of these
drugs has been the utilization of interdiction and military forces through “crackdowns”.
These two methods have been designed and used to halt the production and
exportation of drugs at the source; ideally stopping the drugs from ever
reaching their targeted populations. While both methods contribute to hindering
the drug trade in their respective regions, interdiction specifically refers to
the seizures of drugs, money, the arrests of traffickers, and the destruction
of drug labs (Gugliotta, 1992). Interdiction has been utilized in both
Peru and Colombia but has been the primary method which the Peruvian government
has used to thwart the groups and individuals participating in the production
of coca paste and cocaine. The other method mentioned, military forces, has
been used in both Colombia and Peru to fight influential cartels,
narcoterrorists, and revolutionary forces which have plagued these countries
since the early 1970’s to present day.

            While both Colombia and Peru have
utilized said methods in countering the illegal drug trade, both have
experienced different problems in being able to fully accomplish their
political and social goal of ending the production and trade of illegal drugs.
In the case of Colombia, the rise of drug ‘barons’ and cartels have made it
difficult to conduct meaningful political and judicial reform, and institute
democratic policies since these groups wielded significant wealth, were able to
buy their judicial impunity, bribe elected officials, and form their own
security networks. All of which worked to their advantage in maintaining their influence
over the political actors and institutions in Colombia. Unfortunately for the
Colombian government during the 1980’s, the drug traffickers wielded so much
political and judicial power resulting in them being “…acquitted by corrupt or
intimidated judges, or by judges devoted to judicial formalities that worked in
the traffickers’ favors” (Melo, 1998, p.71). In addition, groups such as the
Medellin cartel quickly resorted to widespread violence and acts of terrorism
in retaliation to the Colombian government choosing to escalate its war on drug
trade organization and begin conduct raids on cartel cocaine producing
laboratories using government military forces (Melo, 1998).
Notably, the use of these forces has produced varying results because these institutions
and people within them were generally corrupt.

Continually, the ineffectiveness of the
Colombian judicial system stemmed from its consolidation around a traditional
system of judicial practice. The traditional system centered on the ability to
solve legal issues within small town environments where the individuals within
these towns knew one another and the integrity of these people’s testimonies
could be trusted. Thusly, Colombia’s traditional judicial system was ill
prepared to change and handle the rise of national and international issues
like cartels and guerilla forces. With this judicial system relying heavily on
oral testimonies, a high focus on formal procedures, and the protection of the
procedural rights of the accused, drug trade organizations were able to penetrate
the judicial system by buying off witnesses, judges or resorted to intimidation
(Melo, 1998). Due to the ability of these organizations to influence the
judicial system and its method of largely basing its decisions off confessions
and testimonials demonstrates that the Colombian judicial system was
ineffective in enacting the rule of law and contributing to the fight against
ending the drug trade in Colombia.

Comparably, Peru has also faced issues
regarding its judicial system being able to formally handle the rise of coca
plant cultivation and cocaine production. Although it has struggled, Peru did not
face the same issues that Colombia had to face regarding the influence and deep
ties that cartels had created within the Colombian governments’ judicial and
political branches. Furthermore, Peru hasn’t faced the same serious threats
that Colombia has regarding revolutionary forces like the FARC and AUC groups.
Although both Colombia and Peru have struggled to combat the drug trade judicially,
Peru’s judicial system has largely been playing the role of ‘catch-up’ because
of the sudden rise of powerful cartels, the creation of the cocaine industry,
and the growing threat of the political guerrilla group; the Shinning Path.
This is evident through its inability to pass legislation making the
consumption of psychoactive drugs illegal and properly persecuting individuals
who have committed drug-related crimes (Lerner, 1998). Ultimately, the Peruvian
legal system lacks integrity and authority regarding drug control due to the reason
that it has had traditional ties to the coca leaf as well as a large portion of
its rural population being involved in the cultivation and production of coca
paste and or cocaine. Thusly, it is difficult to change a social phenomenon
like this because the use of the coca plant has been engrained and accepted
into the social norm and had been legally tolerated until the 1970’s.

            Comparatively, both Colombia and
Peru have utilized the methods of interdiction. One aspect of interdiction that
has been used to combat the cultivation of illicit drugs such as the poppy and
coca leaf has been the use of aerial fumigation. Although both governments have
used this method, it has proven to be ineffective and highly damaging to the
eco-system and inhabitants of the area because of the use of harmful herbicides
and pesticides. Heather Ahn-Redding expands on why aerial fumigation has proven
to be problematic specifically in Colombia. She explains that this method of
eradication has become difficult because drug trade organization continually
move further southward following each aerial fumigation raid. Simply, the more
aerial raids the Colombian government conducted the farther south these drug
trading groups moved their crops resulting in the aircraft performing the
fumigating to fly deeper into rebel territory making them vulnerable to ground
fire (2005). In both Colombia and Peru, quantitative
data demonstrates why this method of eradication was ineffective,

…between 1989 and 1992 resulted in a tiny
reduction of coca fields from 121,300 hectares to 120,000, according to US
government surveys. The financial losses to the guerrillas were not
significant. Similarly, in Colombia, despite massive drug eradication efforts
in the 1990s, the amount of coca grown in South America stayed about the same,
around 200,000 hectares… (Felbab-Brown, 2005, p.
36)

 Lastly,
the use of aerial fumigation in both Colombia and Peru negatively impacted the
eco-systems, livestock, and people living in these areas. It made the lands
that were sprayed ill fertile because of the harsh herbicides and pesticides
used. To conclude, this method of interdiction would not have needed to be used
had the Colombian and Peruvian governments utilized alternative methods of
interdiction rather than opt for a poison which not only negatively impacted
the environment but also the citizens of these nations.

            One of the major hurdles that both
the Colombian and Peruvian governments have had to tackle to combat the trade
of illegal drugs has been finding a way to expand and enact their political and
military will in every corner of the country. This has proven difficult because
both Colombia and Peru lack the infrastructure to allow individuals to access
all parts of the country. Furthermore, the geography of Colombia and Peru are
mountainous and are apart of the Amazon rainforest; sprawling with dense
vegetation making difficult to travel.[3]
Continually, with the rise of guerrilla forces in both Colombia and Peru, these
groups have utilized the terrain to their advantage specifically in the regions
of Caqueta and Meta in Colombia and the valleys of Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro in Peru.
In Colombia, the group known as FARC made things particularly complex for
Colombian governments to solve as it stood as a significant military threat to
the security of the country. The FARC was also heavily involved in the illegal
drug trade and was often united with traffickers against the Colombian
government. Melo (1998) explains this relationship: “The guerrillas received
resources and access to contacts who provided them with arms. While the drug
trade gained a means of protecting crops.” (p. 80). United and sharing
resources, the traffickers and guerrilla groups posed a prominent political
threat to the Colombian government. Ultimately, the Colombian government was
ill-equipped to handle such an active threat because of its weak judicial
system and lack of political influence outside of urban centres and as a
result, these groups were able to engage in the trade of illegal substances largely
unopposed.

            In Peru, it too also faced strong
opposition from a guerrilla group known as the Shinning Path; a group founded
on Maoist ideology that operated primarily in the Upper Huallaga Valley during
the early 1980’s. Like Colombia and the FARC, the Shining Path also engaged in
the trade of illegal drugs and offered protection to traffickers. Although
Colombia and Peru both had to combat guerrilla groups, Peru was largely
successful in eliminating the threat that the Shining Path posed. It accomplished
this by swaying the support of the peasantry living in the Upper Huallaga
Valley to align with the governments military forces thus enabling the Army to
engage the Shining Path and greatly reduce its numbers, ousting it from the
valley and eliminating its support structure. Although Peru was successful in
eliminating the threat of the Shining Path it failed to bring an end to the
drug trafficking problem following the election of Peru’s President Alan García in 1985.[4]
Consequently, Garcia ended the military campaign in the valley and utilized
methods of interdiction rather than military force. Accordingly, traffickers
were able to thrive and began to grow their operations as they stood unopposed.
Unfortunately, this cycle of military repression and drug trafficking
resurgence continued until the mid 1990’s. Even with military repression, Peru,
like Colombia, faced corruption problems as its military officers, “…earning
$283 (division general) to $213 (second lieutenant) a month would have to face
the task of arresting criminals that could offer them the possibility of
earning up to 70,000$ a year.” (Dreyfus, 1998, p. 28). In sum, Colombia and
Peru have faced the issue of guerrilla groups and powerful drug trafficking
organization. While Colombia faced harsh opposition from cartels and the FARC;
it was largely unable to deal with these issues, militarily and politically
simply opting for a peace treaty. On the other hand, Peru was intermittently
successful in eliminating the Communist group known as the Shining Path through
the use of military force and then resorting to interdiction tactics. The
striking aspect that both these countries have faced is the problem of high
corruption rates largely a by-product of poor economic standing resulting in
weak security, judicial, and political institutions.

            To conclude, Colombia and Peru have
faced many issues due to the rise and dominance of the international drug
trade. The trade of illegal drugs has impacted all areas of society and
continues to be a place of contention in the Western world. For Colombia and
Peru, the illegal drug trade became prominent through different means. In Peru
it started through tradition and out of necessity, comparatively, in Colombia
it was started through cartels. Although both countries began engaging in the
trade of illegal drugs under different circumstances, the governments of these
countries have utilized similar methods to combat the trade of illegal drugs.
The first method utilized by both Colombia and Peru was varying aspects of
interdiction. Notably, initiating programs of crop substitution and of
destroying coca and poppy plantations using aerial fumigation. These two
methods proved to be ineffective as the cartels and paramilitary groups in both
Colombia and Peru continued to grow their operations and the number of hectares
only diminished slightly. In the case of Peru, crop substitution programs
failed because it was more lucrative for the peasantry to grow the coca plant
rather than change and begin growing other crops; a similar case in Colombia.
In the end, many Colombian’s and Peruvian individuals continued to engage in
the production and trade of illegal drugs because of their country’s weak
political institutions and severe economic crisis making it enticing for
communities to engage in the illegal drug trade as it created work and it paid
a significant amount. Secondly, the judicial branches in Colombia and Peru were
ill-ready for the wave of crime and illegal activity produced by the trade of
illegal drugs. Even with policies passed, both countries judicial systems were
easily corrupted and were not designed to readily produce convictions against
the individuals engaging in the trafficking of narcotics. Lastly, Colombia and
Peru faced similar problems regarding paramilitary forces such as the FARC and
the Shining Path. These groups were able to thrive as the governments of
Colombia and Peru utilized the methods of interdiction and weak military
action. Even when these paramilitary groups and cartels were brought into
court, the problem of weak judicial institutions and rampant corruption played
a part in these countries being unable to stop the rise of the illegal drug
trade. Ultimately, Colombia and Peru have been fighting a loosing battle due to
ineffective political institutions, poor economic circumstances, and rampant
corruption throughout their security and judicial institutions.

References

• Affairs, B. f. (2017, March). International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control. Retrieved from U.S Department of State: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/268025.pdf
• Ahn-Redding, H. (2005). Colombia. In H. A.-R. Caterina Gouvis Roman, Illisit Drug Policies, Trafficing, and Use the World Over (pp. 68-74). Lanham: Lexington Books .
• Data, C. R. (2018, july 24). Colombia’s Drug Trade. Retrieved from Colombia Reports: Data: https://data.colombiareports.com/colombia-drug-trafficking/
• Dreyfus, P. G. (1998, September 24). Cocaine, The Military and the Shining Path, 1980-1995. Geneva, Switzerland.
• Felbab-Brown, V. (2005). Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and Peru. The Journal of Conlfict Studies, 3-36.
• Felbab-Brown, V. (2005). The Coca Connection: Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and Peru. The Journal of Conflict Studies , 104-123.
• Gugliotta, G. (1992). The Colombian Cartels and How to Stop Them. In P. H. Smith, Drug Policy in the Americas (pp. 120-146). Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press.
• Johnson, S. (2001, April 26). Helping Colombia Fix Its Plan to Curb Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Insurgency. Retrieved from The Heritage Foundation: https://www.heritage.org/americas/report/helping-colombia-fix-its-plan-curb-drug-trafficking-violence-and-insurgency
• Lerner, R. (1998). Chapter 5: The Drug Trade in Peru. In E. Joyce, Latin America and the Multinational Drug Trade (pp. 117-132). New York, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc.
• Livingstone, G. (2004). History. In G. L. Pearce, Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War (pp. 57-69). New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
• Melo, J. O. (1998). The Drug Trade, Politics and the Economy: The Colombian Experience. In E. J. Malamud, Latin America and the Multinational Drug Trade (pp. 76-83). New York, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc.
• Policy, O. o. (2018, 11 22). Source Countries and Drug Transit Zones: Peru. Retrieved from Office of National Drug Control Policy: https://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.org/international/peru.html
• Zech, S. T. (2014, April n/a). Drug Trafficking, Terrorism, and Civilian Self-Defense in Peru. Retrieved from Combating Terrorism Center: At Westpoint: https://ctc.usma.edu/drug-trafficking-terrorism-and-civilian-self-defense-in-peru/

[1] Affairs, B. f. (2017, March). International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control. Retrieved
from U.S Department of State:
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/268025.pdf

[2] Gomez, C. (2018). Peru’s Debt Crisis and Subsequent
Shock Economy. [online] International.ucla.edu. Available at:
http://international.ucla.edu/institute/article/19898 [Accessed 19 Nov. 2018].

[3]M. Liliana. (2016). Deforestation and Coca Cultivation Rooted in Twentieth – Century Development Projects. [online] Oxford Academic: American Institute of Biological Sciences. Available at: https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/article/66/11/974/2754290 [Accessed 20 Nov. 2018].

[4]
Dreyfus, P. G. (1998, September 24). COCAINE, THE
MILITARY AND SHINING PATH, 1980-1995. Geneva, Switzerland.