The field of democracy promotion can appear to be a rather vague one, in which the concepts and process are perhaps unknown, especially regarding the purpose. To some, democracy promotion may appear to be a shameless promotion of one country’s own ideals and values onto another country without their consent. However, democracy promotion goes much further than this, and serves as a bilateral or multilateral process with tangible benefits for all parties involved. Support for civil society organizations in specific countries is the most effective method of democracy promotion, and the best method for ensuring a lasting, stable democracy that will result in the expected mutual benefits for the country itself and the international community as a whole. Through the specific case of Colombia, analyzing its lengthy history of internal conflict and multiple attempts at establishing a durable peace through bilateral or multilateral approaches to peace agreements, it can be seen that civil society participation is the key to establishing a strong and lasting peace, and in turn, a viable and healthy democracy.

Perhaps one of the main criticisms of democracy promotion comes from an image of a democratic power storming into a foreign country, using military power to force a transition to democracy. In this situation, it seems highly unlikely that the democratic power intent on instigating a transition to democracy possesses enough knowledge of the situation in that country to be able to pick the local actors best suited for future power in a democratic regime.[1] Using military power as a means to bring about a transition to democracy fails on multiple counts. First, democratic success goes beyond simply having a written constitution or elections. Successful democracies usually require an effective legal system, a broad commitment to pluralism, a decent level of income and education, and widespread confidence that political groups that may fail in one round of elections still have the possibility of success in future elections, thus incentivizing these groups to keep working within the system.[2] Additionally, using force to spread democracy almost always triggers violent resistance. Nationalism and other forms of local, collective identity remain powerful features of society in today’s world, and most people dislike following orders from armed occupiers.[3] Although direct intervention may be the least desirable method of democracy promotion, it is certainly not the only method. Direct intervention by any country, not only the United States, should always be seen as a tool of last resort in the field of democratization.

Before exploring the
other, more effective possibilities for democracy promotion, it is important to
assess the reasons for promoting democracy in the first place. Most scholars
agree that the key benefits inherent to strong democracies include improved
bilateral relations, enhanced economic development, and an improvement in equal
access to justice.[4]
Bilateral relations are improved as sustainable democracy promotes stability
within a region, and that stability flows from internal regional politics built
on consensus and peaceful competition, often promoting similar international
conduct from other governments. In addition to this enhanced stability, research
studies within international relations show that established democracies never
go to war with each other.[5] Although there are some
cases, such as that of China, that challenge the idea that democratic
governments are the most conducive to economic prosperity, it is widely
believed that history will show that democracy yields the most prosperity. It
can be seen that democracy’s inherent elements of freedom of expression and
respect for the rule of law facilitate long-term economic growth.[6] This enhanced economic
development resulting from democratic governance in a region leads to improved
quality of life and more political freedoms for citizens. These factors can
also be seen through the improvement in equal access to justice for all groups
that comes along with the development of democracy. Democratic support for
pluralism is a critical feature in ensuring that human capital is not wasted,
and the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, women, and migrants are
respected.

Considering these
benefits of democracy, it seems only logical to want to increase the number of
democratic countries throughout the world. However, if direct intervention is
not the best way to achieve democratization, then there must be another, more
desirable method. This method, the most effective alternative to direct
intervention, is to engage and support civil society around the world. Civil
society groups, be it nongovernmental institutions or individual activists on
the local level, solve the problem of being unsure of how to most successfully
implement a new democratic order. Civil society groups are already equipped
with the first-hand knowledge of the current situation, and are best prepared
to offer viable solutions or methods for increasing democracy in their country.
In general, civil society can contribute to democracy in a few central ways:

1. it counters state power,
2. it facilitates political participation by helping in the aggregation and representation of interests, and
3. it serves as a political arena that could play an important role in the development of some of the necessary attributes for democratic development.[7]

The global realization
of the importance of aiding civil society groups in democratization efforts can
be seen through the increased support for these groups from Western countries
over the years. Since 1991, especially for civil society development, bilateral
and multilateral donor assistance for democracy promotion has increased
dramatically.[8]
In addition to support from individual donors, there has been a recent call
within existing organizations for defined means to support civil society. In
2006, the United Nations launched the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF), providing
support for an array of civil society organizations. This made strides towards
programmatic efforts to match prior dialogue concerning the importance of civil
society to economic development and human rights.[9] The fund focuses on giving
grant-based aid specifically to local nongovernmental organizations, rather
than UN agencies or local governments as implementers, funding a broad range of
foundational elements of democracy.[10] The development of this
fund serves to again demonstrate the importance of civil society in promoting
democracy regionally, and its implications on a global scale.

In a post-conflict
environment especially, civil society stands out as an important element in the
successful implementation of programs intended to create a lasting peace, as
well as to pave the way for improvements in democratic functions resulting from
that peace. Civil society can play a critical role in promoting peace
agreements during times of war-to-peace transitions.[11] Actors from civil society
can support the reintegration of former combatants, contribute to the delivery
of humanitarian aid, improve the performance of political and economic
institutions, and cultivate greater trust between different parties through
civic engagement.[12] While the participation
of an engaged and active civil society plays a key role in establishing a
viable democracy, it is important to ensure that a broad range of actors, not
only the political or social elite, are afforded the opportunity to participate
in civic life. By expanding participation beyond the elite, civil society as a
whole is also included in the process, which in turn contributes to the
deepening of democracy. Structurally, civil society organizations should seek
to form horizontal networks with other civil society organizations and
grassroots movements. According to Putnam, it is these linkages and networks
that generate the social capital needed for democratization.[13] This coordination among
civil society increases the likelihood of the permanence of their efforts,
whether they are calling for accountability from government or seeking to work
together with government in pursuit of the organizations’ goals.[14] Coordination between
civil society and government is particularly important in the post-conflict
environment, as it demonstrates a government’s willingness to incorporate those
affected directly by conflict in any resulting attempts at developing peace.
Peace is a necessary element of achieving a stable democracy, and as such civil
society stands out as one of the critical elements in successful
democratization efforts.

Within the overall field
of democracy promotion, there are different entities dedicated to the cause.
These entities range from government institutions to independent organizations,
either with varying degrees of financial dependency on the government or, in a
few cases, complete independence from the government. Nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) are important when it comes to promoting democracy, as
this status allows them to act independently from the government. Although the
work of government entities and NGOs often overlaps, the independent nature of
NGOs allows them to explore different methods and utilize different tactics
while working towards democratization.

The National Endowment
for Democracy is a private, nonprofit foundation dedicated to the growth and
strengthening of democratic institutions around the world.[15] In new and developing
democracies, The National Endowment for Democracy, or the NED, focuses its
support on two objectives: strengthening the institutions and procedures of
electoral democracy to ensure free and fair elections, and encouraging the
gradual consolidation of liberal democracy by measures that strengthen the rule
of law, protect individual liberties, and foster social pluralism.[16] The NED receives funding
via an appropriation in the Congressional budget. Although the NED is funded by
Congress, it is still able to act independently from the government regarding
the ways in which it chooses to use its annual appropriation. With a relatively
low overhead cost, much of the funding can be used directly on the programmatic
aspects of the NED, which are achieved through its grant-making process.

Out of its
appropriation, the NED must split a portion equally among its four core
institutes, leaving the rest as discretionary funding for regional grants. These
core institutes are the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
(NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the Center for
International Private Enterprise (CIPE), and the American Center for
International Labor Solidarity (“Solidarity Center”). The relationship between
the Endowment and the institutes provides institutional balance, built-in
bipartisanship, and reassurance to Congress and others that the Endowment will
be even-handed in its judgments and receptive to diverse approaches to
democratic development.[17] These institutes receive
the bulk of their funding from the Endowment, with additional funds from
different government organizations such as the U.S. Department of State, the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), as well as other government bodies, both foreign and domestic,
organizations working in similar fields, and private donations.[18]

Although these core
institutes are affiliates of the NED, they take a rather different approach to
democratization. Many other organizations focusing on promoting democracy
employ a more top-down approach. Despite the fact that projects funded by NDI,
IRI, or NED almost always focus on the same beneficiaries, the organizational
approach between NED and NDI or IRI is essentially reversed. Most projects
funded by either NDI or IRI, for example, take the shape of a proposal from one
of those organizations to NED requesting a grant. From there, they would find a
local organization to carry out the activities proposed in the grant, with the
democracy promotion organization acting as an implementer through the local
organization, rather than the local organization implementing their own ideas
with the resources and support of the democracy promotion organization.

In contrast to this
approach, NED employs a bottom-up, grassroots approach to democracy promotion.
Rather than have a local organization implement NED’s ideas of what democracy
promotion should look like, or the steps that should be taken to reach a democratic
system, NED receives proposals directly from civil society groups and local
activists or organizations and then decides which of those proposals to fund
through a grant. Through this process, civil society takes the lead in
determining what actions will be the most effective in terms of constructing
democracy in their country, and civil society organizations are also in charge
of the implementation of those actions and ideas. As mentioned previously, it
is unlikely that any foreign organization would be able to accumulate the
required expertise and knowledge of the local situations to be able to
effectively choose leaders to implement democratic ideals in a specific country
or region. Considering this, the Endowment also works to cultivate partner organizations,
in addition to funding individual groups, activists, or civil society
organizations through the grant-making process. In many newer democracies,
there are emerging organizations looking to share their own democratic
expertise with democrats in countries that are still working toward democratic
breakthroughs.[19]
NED originally funded many of these groups as they worked for democratic
transition within their own country, and as a result of their success, they can
now act as experienced guides for new activists facing similar struggles.[20] These partner
organizations help to strengthen local groups and movements, in a way that
allows for expert advice and support, but still with a more hands-off approach
than direct foreign intervention. Again, as it is shown through numerous
examples in history, if the aim is to create strong democracies and strengthen
democratic values in a specific country or region, then civil society should be
at the forefront of any democracy promotion efforts.

Through the case study
of Colombia, and their history of internal conflict and subsequent negotiations
and attempts at establishing a durable and lasting peace, the importance of
civil society is obvious in achieving this peace, and in turn creating a stronger
democratic system. The work of the National Endowment for Democracy also seeks
to aid this process, providing grants to local actors and organizations with
the aim of ending conflict, establishing peace, and strengthening democracy in
the country and regionally. Colombia’s internal conflict dates back to the
1960s, following a decade of political violence known as la Violencia (1948-58).[21] Excluded from a
power-sharing agreement that ended the fighting, communist guerrillas took up
arms against the government.[22] This led to the
foundation of the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or
FARC), composed of militant communists and peasant self-defense groups.
Operationally, the FARC opposes the privatization of natural resources and
claims to represent the rural poor against Colombia’s wealthy.[23] Another guerrilla
movement resulting from la Violencia, operating
similarly to and with the same program as the FARC, was the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National
Liberation Army, or ELN), founded by students, Catholic radicals, and left-wing
intellectuals hoping to replicate Fidel Castro’s communist revolution.[24] In addition to the FARC
and ELN, right-wing paramilitary groups with links to the state military
emerged in the 1980s as landowners organized together to protect themselves
from the guerrilla groups, further complicating efforts to negotiate an end to
the conflict.[25]
Both the FARC and ELN have used violence, kidnapping, and extortion as sources
of leverage and income. A report from Colombia’s National Center for Historical
Memory estimates that nearly 40,000 people have been kidnapped at least once
between 1970 and 2010.[26] According to government
statistics, more than 10,000 people, including nearly 4,000 civilians, have
been killed or maimed by landmines, most of which were planted by the FARC.[27]  The current president of Colombia, Juan Manuel
Santos, has been the first president in the conflict’s history to reach an
agreement that seems to be taking the necessary steps for creating a lasting
peace. Prior peace accords date back to the 1980s, all exploring similar
elements to the current accord, but lacking effectiveness in the implementation
process. Most of these prior accords lacked involvement from civil society or
the international community, resulting in bilateral negotiations that failed to
reflect critical elements that might have been the key to success.

The La Uribe Accord (1984) was signed between the Peace Commission
under the Betancur administration and the FARC, establishing a bilateral
ceasefire lasting for almost two and a half years, despite initially being set
for only one year.[28] The agreement established
various commissions for its verification, and the government committed itself
to pushing a series of political and social reforms through Congress during
this period, including important aspects of the political system and social
structure, especially regarding agrarian reform and land rights.[29] As a result of this
agreement, the FARC gradually transformed into a legal political party, but the
procedures for this transition were unclear, lacking specific timetables and
with no talk of disarming insurgents or reincorporating them into civilian
life.[30] The Peace Commission
included symbolic participation of representative members of civil society, but
in the end the process was centered on bilateral talks between the government
and the FARC, excluding the potential for civil society and other actors to
participate in the process. In practice, local branches of government were
rarely consulted, leaving the entire process up to the discretion of the
Executive branch, and few policies were actually carried out. In reality, only
one of the ten bills presented to Congress was approved, and even then still
fell short of expectations once implemented. Social relief programs were
created, but lacked sufficient funding and were unable to get off the ground.[31] In addition to the lack
of successful implementation of legislation, the verification commissions were
never given a precise mission or adequate infrastructure and logistical support
to carry out their missions, and mutual accusations of ceasefire violations led
to a climate of doubt, exactly the opposite of what the verification process
was intended to generate.[32] The international context
at the time was also unfavorable, with Cold War tensions increasing and U.S.
antagonism towards the process as a whole, made any international participation
in the peace process nearly impossible.[33] This combined with
guerrilla attacks on government bodies effectively put an end to this period of
negotiations and attempts at creating a lasting peace in Colombia.

Following the Betancur
administration, there were no formal negotiations or attempts at creating a
peace agreement with the FARC until the Pastrana administration in 1998. In May
1999, the government and the FARC signed the Agenda for Change for Peace.[34] The Caquetania Accord
introduced the idea of international humanitarian law, but it was given low
priority compared to social and structural issues, such as employment and the
economy. The Accord had no mention of guerrilla disarmament or reincorporation
into civilian life, and no clear timetable for rebel transition to legal
political activity, although it did establish mechanisms for citizen
participation.[35]
Public hearings were proposed to serve as a bridge between ideas emerging from
common people, allowing those ideas to reach the negotiations that were limited
to just the government and the FARC. These procedures signaled greater
willingness to open the process to incorporate civil society, but the
methodology continued to reflect the bilateral model of previous negotiation
attempts.[36]
The Caquetania Accords were never fully developed, despite their importance, and
the process was frequently interrupted by unilateral suspensions from one side
or the other.[37]
Pastrana incorporated a personal approach to negotiations, meeting directly
with the FARC leader, Manuel Marulanda, but still maintaining the formal
institutions of the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, as
established by the previous administration.[38] This approach was again
incorporated in a meeting between Pastrana and Marulanda in an attempt to
“save” peace, resulting in the signing of the Los Pozos Accord (2001), which introduced the first discussion of a
ceasefire and a prisoner exchange. It also proposed mechanisms to include more
external actors, including ten nations of the international community to serve
as observers, in the creation of the so-called “group of friends.”[39] The direct introduction
of international actors to the process was significant break from previous
attempts, and provided a framework for future international involvement in the
peace process.

In addition to
involvement from the international community, the Pastrana administration also
marked a more formal consideration of elements of international humanitarian
law. The issue of prisoner exchange was not included in formal peace dialogues,
but treated as a matter meriting a separate negotiation.[40] The FARC had previously
demonstrated a clear lack of respect for international humanitarian law, as
reflected by the mounting numbers of kidnappings, recruiting children as
fighters, and other assaults on human rights.[41] Pastrana’s ability to
reach an agreement with the FARC allowing for a prisoner exchange within the
realm of international humanitarian law was momentous, as it revealed the FARC’s
willingness to recognize the norms of international humanitarian law for the
first time. As a party to the Geneva Convention Protocols, and the UN Treaty
adhering to a Global Agreement on Human Rights and International Humanitarian
Law, Colombia’s adherence to the principles set forth in those documents would
provide a more solid foundation for peace negotiations than what previously
existed, largely due to the reciprocal nature of the obligations as enhancing
the prospects for moving the peace process forward.[42] All of these elements
seemed to be working towards solidifying the peace process, especially when
considering the emphasis placed on the role of civil society and the
international community as party to and enforcers of the accord throughout the
process.

Unfortunately, however,
relations between the two groups appeared to be deteriorating again, despite
intervention by the United Nations and the “group of friends.” In early 2002,
the FARC hijacked a plane and kidnapped a senator, leading to Pastrana’s
decision to break off the peace talks entirely, and ordering government troops
to retake previously established demilitarized zone, ending the prior efforts
over the past three years to reach peace through dialogue.[43] Although unsuccessful in
reaching peace, the Pastrana administration still made considerable strides
towards incorporating important elements in the peace process, most notably
incorporating elements of international humanitarian law and the international
community, as well as expanding at least some elements of the negotiation
process to civil society.

Elected in 2010, Santos
and his administration made a renewed effort at reaching peace, and began
formal, exploratory peace talks with the FARC in 2012. During this phase, the
Colombian government and the FARC exchanged views on ending the conflict and
established conditions for initiating peace talks, and signed a “General
Agreement to End the Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,” creating a
framework for the process and establishing a detailed agenda for discussion.[44] The direct talks between
the Colombian government and the FARC took place in Havana, Cuba between and
October 2012 and November 2016, ending with the signing of the final peace agreement.
Civil society participated during the entire process, sending their proposals
and suggestions to both parties. In addition to submitting proposals, sixty
victims of the conflict, representing the diversity of Colombians affected in
terms of age, gender, ethnicity, regional origin, type of victimization, and
actor responsible for the victimization, visited Havana to share their stories,
and their ideas and expectations on the peace talks and implementation of an
Agreement between the parties.[45] This direct involvement
of civil society in the peace process was a break from previous approaches to
negotiating peace agreements, demonstrating the willingness of the government
to consider the impact of civil society participation, emphasizing the
importance of civil society in post-conflict situations and the resulting path
to peace.

Even prior to the formal
negotiations in Havana, Colombians were involved in the design of the framework
for the peace agreement, with grassroots movements taking hold throughout the
country, where farmers and indigenous people have asserted their agenda and
religious leaders have initiated dialogue and reconciliation at the local
level.[46] Welcoming input from
victims in this round of negotiations demonstrates the commitment from both the
government and the FARC to victims’ rights to truth, justice, reparations, and
guarantees of non-repetition. This again demonstrates the government’s
willingness in this round of negotiations to break from the methodology
employed during rounds of negotiations in the Betancur and Pastrana
administrations that overlooked the importance of civil society in the peace
process. As previously stated, civil society holds an important position in
times of war-to-peace transitions, and can serve to bridge the gap between
citizens and the government.  In the
current peace accord, the victims were included directly in the process, along
with the government and the FARC, and the victims were the ones seen as the
driving force behind the negotiations. The process is one that focuses on local
ownership and has incorporated a bottom-up approach that reflects victims’
experiences and opinions with minimal external influences.[47] In essence, the 2016
peace accord is one negotiated by Colombians, for Colombians.[48] In a post-conflict
environment, the engagement of civil society can be the difference between
cycles of negotiations that eventually circle back to the beginning, establishing
any lasting effects, or an effective end to conflict and a transition towards
creating a lasting peace.

Despite the evident
priority being given to civil society in this accord and the potentially
positive implications this could have for successful implementation, some
concerns still remain. Considering that the final agreement was only signed a
little over a year ago, it is still too soon to make a final assessment on the
effectiveness of the peace accord in practice. Regardless of this, the initial
impact of the accord still seems to have positive impacts, including stimulating
citizen participation, an encouraging factor when considering the role of civil
society in the success of peace negotiations. The impact on citizen
participation was particularly seen among peasant and popular sectors, and also
fostered a national dialogue on democracy, the rule of law, and tolerance.[49] There are some lingering
concerns that the Santos administration remains reluctant to tackle structural
imbalances in Colombia’s democracy, instead focusing overwhelmingly on FARC’s
immediate demobilization and disarmament. While these are valid concerns, it
should be noted that previous attempts at achieving peace from prior
administrations, such as the Betancur administrations attempts for negotiating
with the FARC, which placed reforms over disarmament in terms of priority, were
ultimately unsuccessful.[50] While social reforms are
admittedly an important aspect in the peace process, disarmament is perhaps the
most critical step in the initial phases of the process. Without disarmament of
the guerrilla groups, the guerrilla groups’ commitment to the process is called
into question, leaving citizens in a state of unrest, as the potential for
violent attacks persists with continually armed guerrilla groups throughout the
country. Immediate demobilization and disarmament of the FARC is important, as
only full disarmament has the potential to reduce the violence to a level below
what international law considers an armed conflict.[51] Only after the FARC have
demobilized and disarmed can there be progress towards instituting
comprehensive social reforms. These reforms should be designed with
participation from civil society, and as such will serve the overall goal of
improving democracy in the country.

The international
community also occupies an important role in the post-conflict process. In
addition to the four countries explicitly asked to be involved in the peace
process, Cuba and Norway as guarantor countries and Chile and Venezuela as
accompanying countries, the United Nations also plays an important role in the
successful implementation the peace agreement. The United Nations Verification
Mission in Colombia exists to verify the reintegration of former FARC members
into political, economic and social life and the security guarantees for former
FARC members, their families and communities in the territories.[52] The Final Agreement
provided for the establishment of a second special mandate of the UN Mission in
Colombia. The second mission should be responsible for the verification of the
reintegration process and the implementation of security measures, and should
begin operations upon completion of the first mission, which was the
verification of the ceasefire agreement between the government and the FARC.[53] The involvement of the
international community in the implementation process of the 2016 accord may
prove to be a critical aspect of achieving a lasting peace in Colombia. When
compared to previous administrations and their attempts to negotiate peace,
those lacking the involvement and support of the international community were unfortunately
unsuccessful. A lack of international participation in the peace process during
the Betancur administration ultimately contributed to the overall deterioration
of the peace process itself. Later on, the Samper administration, in its
negotiations with other guerrilla groups, broke from the standard of previous
administrations and began to involve the international community more in the
peace process, specifically in matters of human rights and international
humanitarian law.[54] This focus on
international humanitarian law and the involvement of the international
community extended into the years of the Pastrana administration, although at a
lower priority than other, more domestically-focused issues. Pastrana was the
first to involve international actors in the peace process itself, through the
establishment of the “group of friends” to act as observers to the negotiation
and agreement process.[55] Although the Pastrana
administration’s attempts at peace also ultimately proved unsuccessful, the
participation of the international community in the peace process was an
important first step in recognizing the role of external actors in the process.
Using international concern about the growing effects of the war helped to gain
support for and create awareness of the peace process.[56]

The prior
administrations attempts at negotiating peace and the steps they took towards
involving the international community helped to create a framework for future
attempts at peace. When considering the history, the Santos administration was
able to assess elements of prior accords and focus on incorporating elements
that seemed to offer the potential for success in theory, but were lacking
something in practice. The Santos administration’s decision to involve a few
key international actors in the development of the negotiation process, and to
ensure the involvement of civil society in that process, reflects the
importance of maintaining civil society engagement in post-conflict processes,
as well as the importance of the international community in a guarantor role in
that process.

The role of civil
society in the peace process is perhaps the single most important aspect in
ensuring the creation of a lasting peace. Support for civil society is a
critical feature in being able to reach this goal. During the years of the
negotiation process, the National Endowment for Democracy has worked to support
a number of initiatives each year in Colombia to ensure strong civil society
participation in the peace process. In addition to providing direct support to
local organizations, NED core institutes also worked to support civil society’s
role in the peace process, throughout the years of negotiations. Throughout
2016, the International Republican Institute’s grant, entitled “Ensuring a
Democratic Plebiscite,” sought to support the legitimacy and the peaceful,
democratic conduct of the October 2016 plebiscite on the peace agreement.[57] It is important to note
that the plebiscite in and of itself represents an important aspect of the
government’s attempts to incorporate civil society throughout the peace
process, and respect for the democratic norms of obtaining consent from the
governed regarding governmental decisions or actions. IRI’s proposed project
aimed to provide support to a respected domestic electoral monitoring
organization to increase the number of domestic election observers to ensure
more adequate coverage of polling stations across the country.[58] Supporting a domestic
organization emphasizes the importance of civil society, as many of these
organizations carry out work that outsiders would not be able to effectively
complete. In this case, the organization can act as watchdogs of a sort, ensuring
that participation in the democratic process is available to all citizens.

The National Democratic
Institute, another core institute of the Endowment, also worked to support
democratic values through their 2016 grant, entitled “Preparing for a Post
Conflict Environment.” The goal of this grant was to help consolidate
Colombia’s democracy and generate a more just, inclusive, and accountable
political system.[59] To do so, NDI created
civic education initiatives to foster constructive discussion on the content of
the peace accords, the role of political parties, and political participation
in a post conflict-environment.[60] These initiatives looked
to strengthen civil society’s ability to participate in the entirety of the process,
thus strengthening the role of civil society in a democratic environement.

In addition to
supporting initiatives through the core institutes, the Endowment also provided
numerous grants directly to local organizations working to raise awareness of the
realities of the conflict and the peace process. The NED provided programmatic
support to free press and information sharing organizations, including: Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa, focusing
on supporting freedom of the press and the role of media in post-conflict
scenarios; Fundación las Dos Orillas, which
looked to amplify the voice and visibility of conflict victims, displaced
communities and demobilized guerrillas through digital storytelling; Fundación Ideas para la Paz, aimed at
promoting a deeper understanding of illegal armed actors’ role in the conflict
through in-depth investigative journalism;and Blogósfera Producciones S.A.S,
through their initiative La Silla Vacía, promoting
greater public awareness about the post-conflict situation in the country
through its web portals.[61] All of these
organizations worked to provide resources to the general public, serving the
goal of promoting citizen ownership of the peace process. This reflects the
importance of civil society in the post-conflict process and again demonstrates
the idea of the peace process as being made for Colombians by Colombians. Many
of these organizations have been supported by the Endowment throughout the
previous years of negotiations as well, in addition to other organizations
working with similar initiatives of increasing civil society participation and
ownership throughout the entire peace process.

All the factors seen
thus far in the peace process seem to have promising prospects for an
improvement in Colombia’s democracy. As literature shows, civil society and its
organizations function as central agents in creating more egalitarian and
participatory social orders.[62] Clearly then, this
demonstrates only one small portion of the role civil society plays in helping
to construct stronger democracy as a whole. In the 2016 peace accord between
the Colombian Government and the FARC explicitly recognized the democratic
deficit that exists in Colombia, and states that strengthening Colombian
democracy is fundamental to long-lasting peace.[63] This democratic deficit
largely stems from the widespread violence and control guerrillas,
narcotraffickers, and paramilitaries exert over parts of the country,
undermining the integrity of democracy.[64] Recovering from this
deficit will be a critical element in the successful implementation of the
peace accord, and one that will hopefully lead to an improvement in the
functioning of Colombian democracy.

In addition to the
control aspect, Colombia has also suffered from a representational crisis. This
crisis originated in the exclusion of many citizens, particularly marginalized
populations, from the political process. In attempts to remedy this crisis, in
1991 Colombia carried out a constitutional reform process intended to open up
the political system and promote greater participation.[65] Considering these
elements, the 2016 peace accord also functioned as a promise to promote the
participation of previously marginalized social organizations so as to build a
more representative system.[66] Although it is still too
soon to make a definitive judgment on the success of the peace accord in this
regard, the overwhelming focus on civil society participation in the peace
process shows promise. The negotiation process especially, with the
participation of marginalized groups such as Afro-Colombians and women,
demonstrates both the government’s and the FARC’s recognition of the importance
of civil society in the process, and their subsequent importance for
strengthening democracy.

Overall, the engagement
of civil society is paramount in establishing or strengthening democracy, and
can be seen specifically through the role of civil society in the peace process
in Colombia, and the positive effects that establishing a lasting peace will
have for Colombian democracy. When compared to other methods, support for civil
society as the means for democracy promotion stands out as by far the most
effective form of democratization. Military force is too aggressive, and lacks
the knowledge necessary to ensure that the right individuals or organizations
will occupy leadership roles in the implementation process. Civil society
organizations solve this issue, but foreign democracy promotion organizations
should not seek to use local organizations as a mask for their own democratic
ideas and values. Civil society organizations should be granted ownership of
the democratization process, and foreign democracy promotion organizations
should exist as a means for monetary and technical support, serving as a resource
rather than an active participant. Peace is a critical element in organizing a
healthy democracy, and in post-conflict environments, civil society should be
at the forefront of any negotiations or agreements for peace. Likewise, they
should be involved in the implementation process, and recognized as valued
actors throughout the entire process. In the specific case of Colombia, the
status of the current accord shows promise for strengthening democracy and
achieving peace. Although still too soon to make definitive judgments, the
ownership of the process granted to civil society is a step in the right
direction, and lends a promising view to the future of the implementation
process.

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[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Lagon, “The Whys,” Council on Foreign Relations.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Jamal, “Democracy Promotion,” 12.

[8] Ibid., 4.

[9] Lagon, “The Whys,” Council on Foreign Relations.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Jamal, “Democracy Promotion,” 12.

[12] Ibid., 12.

[13] Putnam, Making Democracy.

[14] Ackerman,
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[15] “About the National,” National Endowment for Democracy.

[16] “Consolidating Democracy,” National Endowment for Democracy.

[17] “Applying a Multisectoral Approach,” National Endowment for Democracy.

[18] Silver, “Soft Power,” Council on Foreign Relayions.

[19] “Applying a Multisectoral Approach,” National Endowment for Democracy.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Felter and Renwick, “Colombia’s Civil
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[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] National Center for Historical Memory, A Kidnapped Truth, 9.

[27] Falter and Renwick, “Colombia’s Civil
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[28] Welna and Gallón, Peace,
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[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid., 97.

[31] Ibid., 98.

[32] Ibid., 99.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., 111.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Hoskin and Murillo, “Colombia’s
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[41] Ibid., 37.

[42] Ibid., 38.

[43] Welna and Gallón, Peace,
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[44] The Office of the High Commissioner for
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[45] Ibid., 3.

[46] Kan, “Colombian Peace,” International Policy Digest

[47] Kan, “Colombian Peace,” International Policy Digest.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Feldmann, “Will Colombia’s,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

[50] Welna and Gallón, Peace,
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[51] Feldmann, “Will Colombia’s,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

[52] United Nations, “About,” UN Verification
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[53] United Nations, “Mandate,” UN Verification
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[54] Welna and Gallón, Peace,
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[55] Ibid., 111.

[56] Ibid., 113.

[57] “Colombia 2016,” National Endowment for Democracy.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Feinberg,
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[63] Feldmann, “Will
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[64] Mainwaring and Peréz-Liñán, “Cross-Currents in Latin America,” 119.

[65] Mainwaring, “The
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[66] Feldmann, “Will
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