The transition of Mozambique: from war to democracy

The history of Mozambique would not been shaped the way it is today without undergoing the disaster of conflicts and the suffering of the people. Such are the examples of the Mozambican Civil War and the Mozambican War of Independence, two conflicts that tore the country apart economically, politically, socially, and culturally. The bubble of de-colonization, pictured as a liberation from colonialism, erupted into civil disorder and chaos. In any event in history, there is an effect to a cause. In the case of Mozambique, no important historical events could have arrived closer to the significance of the two wars that determine the country’s status quo. In a country shackled by the chains of colonialism, the process of de-colonization and democracy has not been achieve without a huge cost. Like the many other African countries in the Cold War, the Mozambican Civil War of Independence and the later Mozambican Civil War were tests to the Mozambican spirit. The search for national unity pulled the Mozambican people through the journey of turbulence and roller-coaster geopolitical implications before finally settling in the home of democracy, a home built in the remnants of catastrophe.

To
begin the story of the liberation struggle, the examination of the colonial
roots of Mozambique provide an interesting outlook in the reasons for achieving
national freedom. Circa 1498, Mozambique settled as a colonial territory under
the auspices of Vasco de Gama. For five centuries, this country became a major
slave trading country for Portugal. At Mozambican ports, men would be
transported to ships sailing for the New World, where the men would be
subjected under slavery. Gradually, the voice of the Mozambican people
protested the colonial oppression that the Portuguese imposed. Soon, the wave
of protests were also heard in other African, Asian, and Latin American
countries. Colonialism was viewed as a crime to humanity. Globally, the concept
of colonial rule became increasingly questioned and was losing its hold on the
world. Sometimes this was as a result of protest from the colonized, and in
other cases, due to a change in stance, and subsequent withdrawal, by the
colonizer. As was the world norm, many countries in Africa gained independence
in the early 1960s. However, the situation was much harder in southern Africa.
Added to the “normal” complexities of power change and independence, countries
in this part of Africa were faced with the reality.

The
origins of war in Mozambique had roots in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia,
where white settlers held political power, had close economic ties with the
Western nations and were considered to be the citadels of the worldwide
anti-communist strategies pursued by the West. In Mozambique and Angola, for
example, political demands by people under colonial rule were severely
suppressed by Portugal, whose dictator Antonio Salazar insisted on the
country’s colonies being considered as “overseas provinces”, and who was
determined to defend and hold onto them to the last. Despite his anachronistic
colonial policies and fascist character attracting international criticism,
Salazar succeeded in forming a military alliance with the Western nations as
early as 1949. This was thanks to his neutrality in the Second World War, his
anti-communist stance and the geopolitical importance of the country’s
colonies. In other words, despite having confirmed the principle of self-determination
during the Second World War, Western nations such as the United States of
America and the United Kingdom prioritized anti-communism over the liberation
and democratization of colonies. This not only made it possible for white
governments in southern Africa to continue to exist, but also made it doubly
difficult for Africans in the region to gain liberation. Mozambicans faced yet
another problem. They had to contend with the historically and culturally meaningless
borders that were artificially created during the “scramble for Africa” at the
end of the nineteenth century. They, therefore, had to fight for liberation
simultaneously with endeavoring to form and unify a nation.

Due
to the vastness of the territory, diverse ethnic and religious groups and
oppression by the colonial authority, this was no mean feat. Yet, inspired by
the independence of other African nations, people in Angola, Guinea Bissau and
Mozambique organized themselves and began armed struggle against Portugal’s
colonial rule. It was the first large-scale armed liberation movement in Africa
since the Algerian War of Independence in the late 1950s to early 1960s. It was
also the first serious armed defiance of colonial authority in southern Africa.
Resistance by Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO), in particular,
attracted public attention not only in Africa but also in the world. This was
because: (1) it confronted Portuguese colonial rule, the “weakest link” among
white powers in southern Africa; (2) it received full support from Tanganyika
(later Tanzania), where the headquarters of the Liberation Committee of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) was situated; and (3) the liberation of
Mozambique made the armed struggle against white rule in neighboring Southern
Rhodesia and South Africa geopolitically easier. Hence, the liberation struggle
in Mozambique interested not only Africans who longed for total liberation from
colonial rule. It also interested white rulers in southern Africa, who were
afraid that their power might be taken away; the Soviet Union and China, which
hoped to gain more allies; Western nations, who were afraid of communist
expansion in the world; people in the Third World, who had experienced
liberation struggles in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America and some
citizens in Western societies, especially socialists. As a result, numerous
bodies representing various stances assisted the liberation struggle in
Mozambique in a multitude of ways.

The
defiance towards foreign rule erupted into conflict in Mozambique when Eduardo
Mondlane, the leader of FRELIMO who established the party on June 25, 1962,
launched attacks on Portuguese posts in Tanzania on September 25, 1964. The
guerilla efforts of the FRELIMO group were aided by the clever tactics of
evasion, ambushing, and sabotaging communication and railroad lines. Guerilla
fighters also manipulated the mountaineous terrain of Mozambique to their own advantage
by hiding away from open targets. Therefore, Portugal’s air superiority was
limited to mere frustration, and the rainy moisty climate of the country
stiffened the progress of Portuguese troops. Heavy rains made it difficult for
the Portuguese to track down the insurgents. Soon, they suffered attrition as
the number of FRELIMO attacks increased. As Portugal sought to increase the
popularity of the colonial war, Mondlane expanded civilian interest in the
guerillas. By 1967, 8,000 guerillas were in combat, further threatening the
hopes of the opposition. To counter the growing defiant threat of the Mozambican
voice, Portuguese officials expanded the infrastructure program of Mozambique.
By 1970, roads, railways, canals, bridges, dams, and irrigation systems went
under construction as the building projects attempted to boost the hopes of
securing native subservience. The FRELIMO, undeterred by the clever ploys that
their enemy used, attacked these construction sites. By 1974, the construction
projects had caused adverse effects in Portuguese popularity, as many native
citizens were expelled from their homes for construction projects.

On
February 3, 1969, Eduardo Mondlane was assassinated by explosives smuggled into
his office in Tanzania. The mail bomb exploded when he opened the letter and
killed him instantly. People suspected that the Portuguese partook in the plan
to counter the Mozambican “threat.” The immediate consequences of the
assassination fueled a power struggle between Mondlane’s successors. Samora
Machel, a fierce critic of the Portuguese regime, won the power struggle. As
the war prolonged, Portuguese generals decided that the American strategy of
hearts and minds, which was the strategy to encourage native enrollment in the
opposing foreign army. General Francisco da Costa Gomes argued that African
soldiers were better because they were cheaper and they create better
relationships with the local populace. The hearts and minds strategy appealed
to the generals because it appeared to facilitate the termination of the
prolonged warfare. Prolonged warfare came at a cost for the Estado Novo
regime—44 percent of the country’s budget was spent on military, absorbing 6
percent of the GDP. The military campaign swept a wave of unpopular protests in
the Portuguese populace. The cost of the colonial wars in Guinea-Bissau,
Angola, and Portugal induced domestic anger. For decades, the authoritarian
Estado Novo regime rode the power of propaganda posters and ignored the
problems of the civilians. While the people suffered, the bureaucratic and
quasi-fascist elite maintained a rigid control over the state.

Despite
the domestic discontent, the Portuguese launched a major counter-offensive in
1970 known as Gordian Knot Operation. Over the course of seven months, a
massive number of Portuguese troops infiltrated the Mozambican and Tanzanian
countryside and involved heavy aerial bombardments to take out the guerilla
campaign. Progress stalled with the arrival of the monsoon season. A
combination of poor coordination and effort hampered initial success. To some
Portuguese officers, the operation was considered as a failure. On December 16,
1972, the Portuguese 6^th command of Commandos in Mozambique wiped
out the inhabitants of a village in the killing known as the “Wiriyamu
Massacre.” Over 150 civilians were slaughtered, as ordered by the soldiers and
military officers. By 1973, to incite sympathy in FRELIMO, FRELIMO soldiers
created the slogan “Aldeamentos: agua para todos,” or resettlement villages:
water for everyone. The slogan was created in response to the Portuguese
attempt of isolation between civilians and FRELIMO bases. The short-term plan
of resettlement was to improve infrastructure. The long-term plan, however, was
to win the difficult war.

As
previously stated, the fierce critic of the Portuguese regime, Samora Machel,
highly opposed white settlement in Mozambican lands. These white settlers had
lived in Mozambican lands for centuries due to colonial attractions, but with
the possibility of a Mozambican victory comes the demise of continued white
settlement. The moderate Mondlane used to allow the peaceful coexistence of
whites and blacks, but the more radical Machel opposed such a plan. Meanwhile
in Lisbon, the unsettling propaganda that the Portuguese government caused for
the past thirteen years appeared to finally lose steam, as anti-war left wing
parties crowded Portuguese politics with protests to end the war. Several
magazines mocked the foreign intervention with satire. The growing unrest
finally culminated in the peaceful, bloodless coup on April 25, 1974, known as
the Carnation Revolution. As thousands of Portuguese citizens left Mozambique,
many soldiers refused to continue fighting. Negotiations between the new
Portuguese administration and Machel’s administration culminated in the Lusaka
Accord signed on September 7, 1974. Formal independence was settled on June 25,
1975.

In
1975, the RELIMO political party was the most popular party in Mozambique. However,
despite its domestic popularity Frelimo’s ascent to power in 1975 was not
entirely unopposed. There were a number of smaller movements vying for power in
the country, but none had had Frelimo’s the widespread and organised urban and
rural support. On a regional level too, there was a strong degree of opposition
from the white minority government of Southern Rhodesia, and the Apartheid
regime in South Africa. As an ardent supporter of Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwean
African National Union (ZANU), and the African National Congress (ANC) of South
Africa, Frelimo placed itself in the front line of attack from its two
neighbours. One of its first acts in power was to close the borders to Southern
Rhodesia, preventing them access to transport and trade routes. Resistanca
Nacional de Mocambique (RENAMO) led by André Matsangaissa was a political
movement which was created by Rhodesia and later then by the South African
government to destroy guerrilla fighters from Zimbabwe and South Africa. Thus,
the new government was violently opposed from 1977 by the Rhodesian government
and South Africa backed RENAMO.

 In general terms, a new resistance was founded
to counter FRELIMO government and to disrupt logistical flow of weapons to
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army fighters in Mozambique boarder areas.
The war had far reaching implications in Mozambique and her neighbors. The war
was intense since RENAMO had the support of the South African government. The
country was caught in between the Cold War in which RENAMO was supported by the
Western governments whilst FRELIMO was supported by Soviet Union and other
Communist states. There was heavy supply of arms to the two sides due to the
power politics as a result of the Cold War. The war was intense in the 1980’s
with increase in political tension, economic recession and lack of social
services. A lot of civilians lost their lives, the economy collapsed and the
lives of Mozambicans were totally changed for the worst. Given this background,
the researchers were encouraged to undertake the research in order to establish
the effects that the civil war had on ordinary civilians of Mozambique who
suffered most from this brutal war, especially in rural areas, which was the
main theater of war.

The
most serious of these political groups, RENAMO, contributed to the most
casualties of war. Until 1980 Renamo was in effect a sub division of the
Rhodesian security forces, but fighting Frelimo. Matsangaissa’s death during a
raid led to internal conflict and ruptures amongst Renamo’s leadership. Afonso
Dhlakama eventually took the lead, but with the 1980 the Lancaster House
Agreement that led to the emergence of the new Zimbabwean state, Renamo was
thrown into further turmoil. The movement was “on the road to destruction” But
during that period South Africa was beginning to take notice of Renamo’s
presence. So instead of closing down Renamo’s activities, the Rhodesians passed
the legacy on to their South African military counterparts. New training camps
were set up in South Africa, and young Mozambican peasants some through
coercion and threats, others voluntarily joined the movement. Once they had
joined, they had little choice but to remain, for those caught trying to escape
were executed immediately. The callow peasants experienced desperation and
often were subjected to harassment. Acts of disobedience were considered
traitorous to the ideals of these training camps. In the quest to gain control
of Mozambique, RENAMO was ruthless in its intentions.

Contemporaneous
with the regional developments, international events were also beginning to
affect Mozambique. First, its vehement anti-apartheid stance, and second
non-alignment. Aware of the pitfalls that foreign aid could bring to
underdeveloped countries, at independence, Mozambique chose not to join the
IMF, the World Bank, and the Lomé Convention. But in a world carved up by Cold
War rivalry, non-alignment and neutrality were not easily tolerated. This
independent stance threatened the Apartheid regime in South Africa, and proved
unacceptable to the incoming Republican administration of Ronald Reagan in
1980. The US was not only vociferously hostile to the Marxist states of Angola
and Mozambique, but also advocated ‘constructive engagement’ with South Africa.
The South Africans, meanwhile, viewed the US’s willingness to engage in
‘constructive engagement’ while maintaining an openly hostile line towards its neighboring
states, as a signal for the intensification of attacks on Mozambique. South
Africa’s main objective was to maximize destabilization and inhibit development
in the region. From 1981 they stepped up their commando attacks and raids into
Mozambique, attacking both ANC members and Mozambicans. The American government
did nothing to discourage these actions. With increased resources and training,
Renamo’s presence throughout Mozambique increased. By 1981 up to 7,000 rebels
were active, up from under a 1,000 during the Rhodesian-command days. Although
Renamo’s primary source of support was South Africa, the group maintained its own
independence and leadership.

The
conflict gathered momentum between 1981 and 1984, as the apartheid regime in
South Africa mounted its destabilization policy in the continent’s southern
cone. Renamo’s operations spread from the central provinces down into the
southern regions of the country. Major transport and communications arteries
were targeted and destroyed. Agricultural production was disrupted as fields
were mined, properties destroyed and peasants and rural populations driven into
Maputo and other cities. Amidst this violence, the entire southern African
region was also hit by the worst drought of the century. Combined with a rise
in oil prices, a world economic recession, and a sudden hike in interest rates,
Mozambique’s exports and the country’s ability to cope with the consequences of
the drought were effected severely. The sustained violence and devastating
famine forced the Mozambique Government (still a one party state under the
control of Frelimo) to engage in negotiations. The first attempt to end
hostilities came on 16 March 1984 when President Machel met Prime Minister
Botha of South Africa at the border town of N’Komati to sign the “Agreement on Non-Aggression
and Good-Neighborliness”. Mozambique was to close down the ANC military bases
in its territory; in return, the South Africans were to halt their support of
Renamo. South Africa reneged. With airlifts and transport routes through
Malawi, it continued to supply Renamo with food, medication, and weapons,
including large numbers of landmines. The Mozambican Government took a
different approach by deciding to negotiate directly with Renamo.

 However, aware of the critical role that South
Africa played in its support for Renamo, the Mozambique government insisted
that the talks be facilitated and mediated by the South African government.
South Africa eventually complied and the regime offered its ‘good offices’ to
bring about a negotiated solution to the conflict. Machel accepted, stating
that his Government would give amnesty and assist in the full reintegration of
all Renamo members who surrendered voluntarily. Three rounds of negotiations
took place from May to October 1984. But the mediators were neither impartial,
nor did they engage in thorough consultations with either side. An atmosphere
of mistrust permeated the talks as statements were misinterpreted. Eventually
failure was declared and both sides took on more extremist positions. Machel
publicly stated that ‘Mozambique will not negotiate with kidnappers, bandits
and criminals. Instead Mozambique will wipe them out, and that day is not far
off.’ On the other side Renamo demanded the country’s presidency for itself.

The
failure of the talks led to the further intensification of the conflict between
1985 and 1986. Neither President Machel’s accidental death in 1986, nor the
ascension of the more moderate Joaquim Chissano into the presidency had much
effect. By 1987, Renamo had gained substantial ground across the country and
received indirect encouragement and backing from a number of conservative and
right wing governments in the west. The war was taking a heavy toll on the
government, forcing President Chissano to modify many of Frelimo’s original
policies and positions via the international community. Meanwhile, Renamo’s
reputation as the ‘Khmer Rouge’ of Africa had also spread. In 1988, following
the publication of a US State Department report, attitudes towards the movement
shifted radically. The Gersony Report, named after its author, Robert Gersony, stated
that Renamo used excessive violence against the civilian population, including burying
alive, beating to death, forced asphyxiation and drowning, and random
shootings. Despite backing from a number of right-wing organizations in the US,
Renamo’s hopes of US Government aid and assistance were eliminated. Moreover,
its own ideological underpinnings and organizational structure were shown to be
ambiguous and malformed. Domestic and regional pressure was also mounting on
Renamo to enter into negotiations.

Although
the conflict escalated throughout the mid-1980s, there were already sectors of
society, notably religious leaders, and other regional actors attempting to create
a peace process. As early as 1984, the Mozambican Christian Council, which
united seventeen of the country’s Protestant churches, set up the ‘Peace and
Reconciliation Commission’. They argued that ‘dialogue is the way forward in
any dispute’, which was an approach that received official rebuff. During the
same period, the country’s Catholic Church, which already had an ambivalent
relationship with the Government (due to its historic ties with the
Portuguese), publicly called for dialogue between the Government and Renamo.
But at the time President Machel refused. By 1987, under the presidency of
Chissano, the Church was finally permitted to openly recognize the parties to
the conflict as well as the possibility of dialogue. Chissano also gave the MCC
the go-ahead to conduct dialogue with Renamo, along very carefully defined
guidelines. Between 1987 and 1988, the MCC joining forces with the Catholic
Church, held a number of meetings with Renamo representatives in the US and in
Kenya. President Moi also took an interest in the negotiations. By November
1988, the church activities had become public. The Peace and Reconciliation
Commission continued with their efforts, meeting Renamo officials and outlining
their objectives. Though aware of Renamo’s hostility towards the Government,
the Commission became convinced of the group’s fatigue and willingness to end
the conflict. In effect, some of the internal conditions necessary for
initiating dialogue existed.

Externally
too, the regional and international political arena was changing. In South
Africa, the domestic political situation was witnessing changes and a gradual
shift away from the principles of Apartheid. With anti-apartheid sentiments
rising, international tolerance towards the ideology had decreased substantially,
and South Africa was under both external and internal pressure to change.
Internationally, the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of Communism towards
the end of 1989 and 1990 was the advent of a new era of optimism and
willingness to engage in ending the proxy wars of the cold war years.
Negotiations started in August 1989 but quickly faltered as it became evident
that the groundwork was still lacking. The Government rejected Renamo’s demands
for recognition as an active political force in Mozambique, and Renamo
back-tracked on its original acceptance of the existing political order in the
country. These talks reached an impasse. However, the process made the Renamo
leader, Afonso Dhlakhama, acutely aware that for Renamo to gain legitimacy in
the eyes of the world, continued negotiations and the participation of the
international community were essential. In the same year, the British
businessman Tiny Rowland and the US Government also became involved, pushing
for direct Government-Renamo talks, within a wider regional context. Rowland’s
multinational corporation and Lonrho shared major business interests in
Mozambique and throughout the region.

The
first direct meetings between Renamo and Mozambican government officials finally
took place at Sant Egidio’s headquarters in July 1990. But it was an
inauspicious beginning as the two sides disagreed on the extent of third party
participation and mediation, and the order of the agenda and events. It took a
further round of talks before both sides agreed to recognize the team of
observers (two Sant Egidio members, an Italian parliamentarian, and Bishop
Goncalves) as the official mediation team. A third round of talks was first
cancelled, and later re-instated following US support for the Rome process, and
series of meetings between the mediation team and regional heads of state.
Finally in December 1990, an agreement was reached on maintaining a partial
cease-fire along major transport routes, and on providing humanitarian agencies
access to the conflict zones. A joint Verification Mission (JVC) was also
appointed, with Renamo nominating Kenya, Portugal, the US and Zambia, and the
government asking Congo, France, the USSR, and the UK to be members. The next
four rounds of talks, held over a one year period tackled issues of political
and electoral reform. As the talks stalled and faltered on, accusations of a
breach of ceasefire were made by both sides, and inevitably little humanitarian
aid reached those in need. But the presence of the JVC and the signed agreement
offered some reassurance to both parties.

Renamo
sought support from the Portuguese government and the United Nations, but both
refused to interfere in the Rome process. The indications were that all parties
(regional and international) were supportive of, and recognized the Sant Egidio
talks as the official negotiations. Any assistance given was aimed to
supplement and enhance that process. In an effort to surmount a number of major
obstacles, the mediators drew up a series of Protocols each tackling specific
issues, and each demanding concessions from both parties. Once again with
support from external observers, the two sides agreed to sign Protocol One. It
indicated that the government was to tolerate and not hinder Renamo’s
international contacts, while Renamo acknowledged its compliance with
Mozambique government laws after the cease-fire. The two sides also agreed that
a joint commission with UN participation, would supervise the implementation of
the General Peace Accord. In essence it was a substantial breakthrough,
establishing mutual political recognition. Shortly afterwards, Protocol Two on Criteria
and Modalities for Forming and Recognizing Political Parties was signed. The
critical issues incorporated were that the government had authority to register
political parties, and that Renamo would be given provisions to begin
activities as a political party once the peace agreement was signed. Protocol
Three on electoral reform took more months of negotiation. But finally with
American advice and encouragement, Renamo agreed to postpone discussions on
constitutional reform and to sign the agreement.

 By June 1992, all sides agreed to include the
US and Portuguese governments formally into the peace process. But there was
little progress being made on the question of military reform. As the
negotiations process in Rome ambled on, a humanitarian crisis was mounting in
Mozambique itself. Aid agencies and major donors applied pressure on both
sides, but still no significant progress was made. Frustrated by the delays in
Rome, in July a summit meeting between President Mugabe, President Masire of
Botswana, Dhlakama, and the US Ambassador to Botswana was arranged by Tiny Rowland.
The meeting gave a positive boost to the proceedings, and Dhlakama agreed to
face-to-face talks with Chissano. In early August, at an ‘African’ summit in
Rome, Chissano and Dhlakama, met in the presence of Mugabe and Rowland and
agreed to a further meeting in October. But behind the scenes there were still
numerous obstacles. Renamo feared for their security after the peace agreement
was signed, and there were signs of dissent amongst the ranks of both sides.

 In a series of smaller meetings with the
mediators who were engaged in ‘shuttle diplomacy’ issues such as the size of
army, reform of the police, and the future of secret service were discussed.
However, the mediation team lacked the authority and means to enforce any
agreements, so the UN was invited in. By October 1992, a number of the issues
were finally resolved. Regional governments including South Africa were
supportive, the UN was to send monitors and troops to uphold the agreement, and
the Italian government agreed to donate US $10 million towards Renamo’s
transformation into a political party. After two years, and with the
involvement of regional and European governments, the United States, the UN, a
major international corporation, not to mention Sant Egidio itself, the Rome
General Peace Accord was signed. The peace agreement brought an end to the
two-decade conflict that ravaged the country in terms of political, economic,
social, and cultural implications. In the eyes of the civilians, the
humanitarian catastrophe could not have destroyed the country at a worse price.
Rape, famine, shootings, abortions, and droughts killed off millions of people.
The District of Chokwe in Mozambique provided a graphic insight into the mad
destruction that gave way to poverty.

In
the District of Chokwe, there was the destruction of economic infrastructure,
which resulted in a low level of production in the industries. This led to some
companies closing down; many people lost their jobs. Consequently, the rate of
unemployment in the District increased to about 80%. When economic activity
grounded to a halt, there was destruction and looting of shops by RENAMO at
Macarretane, Ndzindzine, and Munslow. In the same area, the bridge
Guija-Chokwe, which was used to supply products to other districts like Caniçado
and Chibuto, was destroyed. This meant that products could not find their way
into the market freely. In Chokwe there was a thriving tourism industry before
the war but the anarchy that prevailed in the area made the tourism industry to
collapse. The industry needs a very peaceful environment to flourish but the
atrocities of the war and the images that were coming out of the country in
general prevented people from coming to tourist resorts in Chokwe. The images
showed burnt bodies, mutilated bodies and those amputated by RENAMO; these
generally discouraged people from coming as tourists, not only to Chokwe but to
the whole country in general (Fernando Muianga, interview, 19 August, 2009).
The collapse of the tourism industry reduced local revenue, which was needed
for development after the war. The pervading insecurity also discouraged many
investors from putting their money into the tourism and agriculture industry.

There
was also lack of direct foreign investment flow into the region. This further worsened
the economic problems of Chokwe and the District Government of Chokwe became
bankrupt, to the point that it could not provide adequate services to the local
residences of Chokwe. The people in Chokwe had a lot of livestock, which was
their main source of wealth in the rural parts of the District. Those with
livestock like goats were regarded as the richest in the area. The people lost
their livestock to theft while they simply left others behind. The loss of
cattle affected their socio-economic status. Chief Danita Andrade Tome of
Chiguidela said that the loss of their cattle meant that the people lost hope
of returning to their homes; and some have not returned up till now as they
apparently have decided to start a new life somewhere else. Those people who
went to town in Chokwe found life difficult since they suffered different forms
of exploitation. The exploitation took the form of being paid very low wages or
sometimes not being paid for their work. These people worked as housemaids,
gardeners, guards, bar tenders and messengers. It should be noted that those
who suffered exploitation were victims of their desperation to make a living
since they had no other option than to move on with their lives. There was also
child labor in which young boys and girls were used to work in the field for
long periods of time without getting paid; their wages was sometimes only food.

The
Matsanga killed civilians and threw them in wells. The water system was in a
complete mess but people usually had no other drinking sources. They had to
resort to drinking from unsafe sources such as the river, which in turn caused
diseases like cholera and diarrhoea for the people. Coupled with this was the
increased competition for the scarce resources which resulted into a great deal
of pressure on the available resources. This caused an increase in the level of
infrastructural destruction in the congested areas of Chokwe. The women and
children suffered from the psychological trauma of being caught in between the
war. These suffered from various forms of abuse; which includes sexual abuse by
the barbarian RENAMO soldiers. Sexual abuse was common in areas where RENAMO
forces were operating: rape was used by these forces to instill fear in the
citizenry and to also foreground the government’s inability to protect its
citizens. (Fernando Muianga, interview, 19 August 2009). The women and children
also suffered physical abuse since they were beaten up or made to undergo
degrading punishments in the hands of the RENAMO forces. The government forces
also tortured some people, accusing them of being RENAMO forces. It is however
found that most of those people were mere civilians who were made to suffer
from both forces in the war.

The
government’s main target soon after the war was reconstruction of
infrastructure. The first thing the government did was to encourage people to
go back to the rural areas by giving them assurances of their security. The
government started by reconstructing roads, especially Macarretane to
Massingir, which is important for supplying Chokwe District with fish; it is
the same road which links Mozambique’s Limpopo National Park to Kruger National
Park in South Africa (Paulo Tivane, interview, 08 August, 2009). This was
important for attempting to revive the tourism industry of Chokwe and the
country as whole. There was also the reconstruction of the road linking Chokwe
to Macia, which is important for the supply of agricultural produce to Maputo,
Xai – Xai and other areas. This encouraged many farmers to go back to their
farms since there was a thriving market in Maputo. The reconstruction of roads
paved the way for development since the roads opened the way for trade and
commerce, which had been disturbed by the civil war. The government, with the
cooperation of Non-Governmental Organizations helped in improving the health
sector and education in Chokwe. In Macarretane, they helped in the building of
a secondary school of the same name which reduced the distance and cost of
traveling to get educated. This led to an increase in the number of students
attending secondary schools, thereby reducing illiteracy rate.

There
was also the construction of other schools in other parts of Chokwe such as
Hokwe, which also accrued the number of students attending schools, while in
Nwachicoluane, the government also converted a destroyed Agrarian Institute
into the ADPP Center for Formation of Teachers (Jorge Novela, interview, 10
August 2009). In the center of the district the government constructed three
secondary schools as a way of trying to address the demand for increased number
of students from primary schools. In tertiary education, there was the creation
of two universities in Chokwe, namely the Polytechnic Superior Institute of
Gaza for Agriculture in 2006, as a way of improving knowledge in agriculture;
this encouraged cooperation with commercial farmers to the point that students
are usually attached to Chokwe farms (Interview with Alberto Massingue, 10
August, 2009). These students also produce seeds in green houses and sell their
hybrid seeds to commercial farmers. The government created the Superior School
of Management and Economics in 2007 to respond to demands of workers in public
and private sectors of the economy.

In
the health sector, government built many hospitals in the rural areas. The
construction of hospitals was a response to the people’s demands for an
improved health delivery system which had collapsed during the civil war.
People were in need of clinics and hospitals since many had been amputated,
some had severe wounds from beatings and burns which they suffered from the
civil war. There was also a general health scare since in the urban areas poor
sanitation still persisted and cholera and diarrhea were common (Luis Braz,
interview, 19 August, 2009). The government also equipped hospitals with
medicine with the help of massive donor funds from both the East and West. This
massive aid came as a result of Joaquim Chisasno’s new liberal approach, which
was popular with the west. The congestion of the population in Chokwe urban
center encouraged social problems like prostitution, which some women engaged
in order to get money to sustain themselves; this in turn caused diseases such
as Tuberculosis, Sexual Transmitted Diseases, and HIV/AIDS. Rape was common in
the areas that FRELIMO and RENAMO controlled, and it increased the risk of
people contracting STDs (Fernando Muianga, interview, 19 August, 2009). The
health sector needed to cater for all these problems in order to ensure that
the people moved forward rather than backwards in the development of the
country. For a country to develop, the people or its human resources must be in
good health for it to work towards realizing its goals.

The
governments’ efforts at development was greatly hindered by the corrupt
practices of some of the government officials: those given the mandate to
formulate development projects were the ones abusing the funds. The money meant
for irrigation and other development infrastructure was often diverted for
personal use. Lack of effective monitoring mechanisms in the system meant that
it was difficult to police the local government agents, especially District
Administrators, who happen to be the link between the government and the people.
Corruption meant that some of the projects planned for were not fully
implemented or became costlier to implement (Salomão Macuacua, interview, 02
August 2009). The women who provided a lot of assistance during the war looked
forward to an end to the discrimination against them in the society, especially
in the home. However, women are particularly disadvantaged when it comes to the
struggle for ownership of land as compared to their male counterparts. Most
women in Mozambique depend principally on subsistence agriculture, and thus on
access to land, to ensure their livelihood. Nonetheless, they are denied
ownership of land (Hermele 1997:24).

The
policies of government to encourage development have not helped women that much
as they still do not have rights to land in the irrigation scheme in Chokwe.
The women whose husbands died in the war have no access to land and are obliged
to live on the small plots of land that sympathetic relatives or councils had
allowed them to occupy. Although the land law of 1997 affirms the
constitutional idea that women and men have equal rights to occupy and use
land, the enforcement of this law has proved to be a problem, especially in the
male dominated communities of rural Chokwe. With no other means of survival,
many of the women depend on subsistence agriculture to survive in the village.
In the final, the government should ensure that money meant for development
from donors goes to the intended beneficiaries. The government should put in
place committees in the villages that promote development and see to it that
the money has been spent for the required purposes working closely with local
government authorities. There is a need to set up information centers in the
villages of Chokwe in order to gather information on the needs and aspirations
of the people in the district with regards to development. It is important to
note that many times government authorities are unaware of the problems people
are encountering in their towns or districts. The government in turn will be
pre-occupied with national issues which include trade and defense and not
target specific areas which are in need of attention. The District
Administrator need to be regularly informed by lower agents for development in
the area.

In
conclusion, the deprivation of the human needs and the corruption that stemmed
from the split of national parties in the wake of de-colonization drove the
spirit of a country to near death. The millions of deaths and serious famines
attributed to political violence caused one of the worst humanitarian disasters
in Africa. Mozambique was not the only country to be challenged by these
ordeals. Support for third-world countries in Africa remained nonchalant and
lukewarm due to the high levels of poverty and the conventional idea of
condoning African violence. Many Western nations failed to take heed to the
catastrophe that unfolded before their eyes, such as the Chokwe crisis. Thanks
to NGOs, Mozambique was able to recover slightly from the tragedy of war, but
the deaths ballooned to epic proportions as the war dragged on. Coupled with
the liberation war, war in Mozambique lasted for a total 28 years, a span of
almost three decades. With democracy still a novel idea in Mozambique, the
response to strengthen the national economy and maintain global standards
brought unpredictable waves of change. Old wounds between FRELIMO and RENAMO
reopened in 2013 due to the dispute in local governmental elections. The price
of democracy comes at a cost, and in the rivalry between FRELIMO and RENAMO,
the agenda to rule a country based on the ideology clashes with the
bureaucratic, elitist rule of many African nations. Eastern Bloc and NATO
countries have shaped the Mozambican mentality greatly. Nevertheless, through
the arduous process of peaceful talks and through the changing political
landscape of the world, Mozambique was able to finally settle into peace. The
scar of war would never leave the Mozambican spirit, but in a future that saw
new beginnings, peace was a grateful relief for the national population. With
adversity came hope, and with failure came success. There is a price and reward
to everything.

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